Send16 MCP Server
send16-mcp
npm
v0.5.13
Published by spruikco — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for Send16 — let AI agents send transactional & marketing email, manage contacts/audiences/segments, automations, templates, inbox, suppressions, and webhooks. 79 tools, stdio + hosted HTTP (mcp.send16.com), zero-DNS sandbox sender.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([generate_email_from_url, get_message]) co-exist with external-action tools ([send_email, create_webhook, delete_webhook, regenerate_webhook_secret]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [generate_email_from_url, get_message] → sinks [send_email, create_webhook, delete_webhook, regenerate_webhook_secret]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow generate_email_from_url → send_email
Tools 79
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
create_webhooknetwork egressdelete_webhooknetwork egressgenerate_email_from_urlingests untrusted inputget_messageingests untrusted inputregenerate_webhook_secretnetwork egresssend_emailnetwork egressactivate_automationno sensitive capabilityadd_contacts_to_audienceno sensitive capabilityadd_convo_noteno sensitive capabilityadd_domainno sensitive capability
Show 69 more tools ↓
add_suppressionno sensitive capabilitycheck_domain_healthno sensitive capabilitycreate_actionno sensitive capabilitycreate_audienceno sensitive capabilitycreate_campaignno sensitive capabilitycreate_contactno sensitive capabilitycreate_topicno sensitive capabilitydelete_actionno sensitive capabilitydelete_audienceno sensitive capabilitydelete_campaignno sensitive capabilitydelete_contactno sensitive capabilitydelete_topicno sensitive capabilitydesign_email_templateno sensitive capabilityduplicate_campaignno sensitive capabilityenroll_in_automationno sensitive capabilityget_actionno sensitive capabilityget_automationno sensitive capabilityget_automation_statsno sensitive capabilityget_brandno sensitive capabilityget_campaign_statsno sensitive capabilityget_contact_health_scoreno sensitive capabilityget_contact_timelineno sensitive capabilityget_convono sensitive capabilityget_deliverability_statusno sensitive capabilityget_message_eventsno sensitive capabilityget_templateno sensitive capabilityget_workspaceno sensitive capabilityget_workspace_usageno sensitive capabilityimport_contactsno sensitive capabilitylist_actionsno sensitive capabilitylist_audiencesno sensitive capabilitylist_automation_enrollmentsno sensitive capabilitylist_automationsno sensitive capabilitylist_campaignsno sensitive capabilitylist_contactsno sensitive capabilitylist_convosno sensitive capabilitylist_domainsno sensitive capabilitylist_inbox_countsno sensitive capabilitylist_messagesno sensitive capabilitylist_segmentsno sensitive capabilitylist_suppressionsno sensitive capabilitylist_templatesno sensitive capabilitylist_topicsno sensitive capabilitylist_webhooksno sensitive capabilitylist_workspacesno sensitive capabilitymark_convo_readno sensitive capabilitypause_automationno sensitive capabilitypause_campaignno sensitive capabilitypre_send_reviewno sensitive capabilitypreview_campaign_recipientsno sensitive capabilitypreview_segmentno sensitive capabilityremove_contact_from_audienceno sensitive capabilityremove_suppressionno sensitive capabilityrender_email_contentno sensitive capabilityresume_campaignno sensitive capabilityschedule_campaignno sensitive capabilityscreener_decideno sensitive capabilitysearch_contactsno sensitive capabilitysend_broadcastno sensitive capabilitysend_campaign_testno sensitive capabilitysend_eventno sensitive capabilitysend_replyno sensitive capabilityupdate_actionno sensitive capabilityupdate_brandno sensitive capabilityupdate_campaignno sensitive capabilityupdate_contactno sensitive capabilityupdate_convono sensitive capabilityupdate_topicno sensitive capabilitywhoamino sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (79 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.5.13 latest |
A 96/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-08 |
v0.5.9 |
A 96/100 | 1 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-01 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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