Semantic Code Search MCP Server

semantic-code-search PyPI v0.4.0

Published by sturdy-dev — no publish provenance and no vendor-owned scope, so the publisher could not be verified. The repository link below is self-declared.

Trust grade
A
91/100
Last scanned
Trust
A · 91/100
How safe the published surface and source look. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
A Why this grade 100 − 9.5 = 91/100

Every server starts at 100. These are the exact deductions the deterministic engine applied — each one reproducible, none of it an opinion or an LLM's guess:

PointsWhat was foundCategory
−9.5 Unsafe deserialization ×2 MTC-SRC-007 permissions

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind the deduction.

Findings 4

high Shell/command execution in server code (src/semantic_code_search/embed.py)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`src/semantic_code_search/embed.py:64`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: os.popen(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server src/semantic_code_search/embed.py

high Shell/command execution in server code (src/semantic_code_search/query.py)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`src/semantic_code_search/query.py:37`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: os.system(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server src/semantic_code_search/query.py

medium Unsafe deserialization (src/semantic_code_search/cluster.py)MTC-SRC-007

In the server's implementation (`src/semantic_code_search/cluster.py:62`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: pickle.loads(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server src/semantic_code_search/cluster.py

medium Unsafe deserialization (src/semantic_code_search/query.py)MTC-SRC-007

In the server's implementation (`src/semantic_code_search/query.py:25`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: pickle.loads(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server src/semantic_code_search/query.py

What this scan could not see

Versions

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v0.4.0 latest A 91/100 4 1.5.0 2026-07-23

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MCP Trust Score: A · 91/100
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan semantic-code-search --online --registry pypi

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