seleniumboot-mcp
PyPI
v0.4.1
Published by seleniumboot — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Tool "execute_script" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool execute_script
Untrusted-input tools ([get_page_source, get_page_title, inspect_page, get_network_logs]) co-exist with external-action tools ([execute_script, upload_file]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [get_page_source, get_page_title, inspect_page, get_network_logs] → sinks [execute_script, upload_file]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow get_page_source → execute_script
Tool "get_network_logs" takes a URL/host parameter "url_filter" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool get_network_logs · inputSchema.properties.url_filter
Tool "execute_script" takes a command-shaped parameter "script" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool execute_script · inputSchema.properties.script
Tool "execute_script" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool execute_script
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
execute_scriptruns code / shellget_network_logsingests untrusted inputget_page_sourceingests untrusted inputget_page_titleingests untrusted inputinspect_pageingests untrusted inputupload_filenetwork egressaccept_alertno sensitive capabilityassert_attributeno sensitive capabilityassert_element_countno sensitive capabilityassert_element_not_visibleno sensitive capabilityassert_element_visibleno sensitive capabilityassert_page_containsno sensitive capabilityassert_textno sensitive capabilityassert_titleno sensitive capabilityassert_urlno sensitive capabilitycheck_accessibilityno sensitive capabilityclear_fieldno sensitive capabilityclear_healed_locatorsno sensitive capabilityclear_mock_responsesno sensitive capabilityclear_session_logno sensitive capabilityclickno sensitive capabilityclose_browserno sensitive capabilityclose_current_tabno sensitive capabilitycompare_screenshotno sensitive capabilitydelete_all_cookiesno sensitive capabilitydelete_cookieno sensitive capabilitydetect_selenium_bootno sensitive capabilitydismiss_alertno sensitive capabilitydouble_clickno sensitive capabilitydrag_and_dropno sensitive capabilityemulate_deviceno sensitive capabilityfill_formno sensitive capabilityfind_elementno sensitive capabilityfind_elementsno sensitive capabilityfind_shadow_elementno sensitive capabilitygenerate_csharp_nunitno sensitive capabilitygenerate_gherkinno sensitive capabilitygenerate_github_actionsno sensitive capabilitygenerate_gitlab_cino sensitive capabilitygenerate_java_junit5no sensitive capabilitygenerate_java_page_objectno sensitive capabilitygenerate_java_testngno sensitive capabilitygenerate_jenkins_pipelineno sensitive capabilitygenerate_playwright_hintsno sensitive capabilitygenerate_python_testno sensitive capabilityget_alert_textno sensitive capabilityget_attributeno sensitive capabilityget_console_logsno sensitive capabilityget_cookiesno sensitive capabilityget_current_urlno sensitive capabilityget_healed_locatorsno sensitive capabilityget_local_storageno sensitive capabilityget_session_logno sensitive capabilityget_session_storageno sensitive capabilityget_table_datano sensitive capabilityget_textno sensitive capabilitygo_backno sensitive capabilitygo_forwardno sensitive capabilityhoverno sensitive capabilityis_displayedno sensitive capabilityis_enabledno sensitive capabilitylist_windowsno sensitive capabilitymock_responseno sensitive capabilitynavigateno sensitive capabilityopen_new_tabno sensitive capabilityrefreshno sensitive capabilityright_clickno sensitive capabilityscroll_byno sensitive capabilityscroll_to_bottomno sensitive capabilityscroll_to_elementno sensitive capabilityscroll_to_topno sensitive capabilityselect_optionno sensitive capabilitysend_keysno sensitive capabilityset_cookieno sensitive capabilityset_local_storageno sensitive capabilityset_session_storageno sensitive capabilitystart_browserno sensitive capabilityswitch_to_default_contentno sensitive capabilityswitch_to_frameno sensitive capabilityswitch_to_windowno sensitive capabilitytake_screenshotno sensitive capabilitytype_in_alertno sensitive capabilitytype_textno sensitive capabilitywait_for_elementno sensitive capabilitywait_for_network_idleno sensitive capabilityCross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.4.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan seleniumboot-mcp --online --registry pypi
Security scan results for the 1stay MCP server.
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