Duckdb Mcp Native — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@seed-ship/duckdb-mcp-native",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@seed-ship/duckdb-mcp-native"
},
"server": {
"name": "@seed-ship/duckdb-mcp-native"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 82,
"threatScore": 89,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 11.03,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.5,
"appliedPenalty": 3.15
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.25,
"appliedPenalty": 1.58
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (30 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/compute-session.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/compute-session.js:100`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/compute-session.js"
},
"evidence": "on: true, async exec(sql, params) { const start = Date.now(); try { retu",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/compute-session.js",
"line": 100,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/federation/QueryRouter.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/federation/QueryRouter.js:238`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/federation/QueryRouter.js"
},
"evidence": "; await exec(sql); } finally { try { await f",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/federation/QueryRouter.js",
"line": 238,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/connection-reset.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/connection-reset.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/utils/connection-reset.js"
},
"evidence": "port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import { logger } from './logger.js'; export class ConnectionReset { activeC",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/utils/connection-reset.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/tools/ducklake-tools.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/ducklake-tools.js:319`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/ducklake-tools.js"
},
"evidence": "result = await session.exec(`${queryWithTempTable} LIMIT ${input.limit}`); // Clean up",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/tools/ducklake-tools.js",
"line": 319,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/tools/graph-export.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/graph-export.js:46`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/graph-export.js"
},
"evidence": "; await session.exec(`COPY (SELECT * FROM ${nodeTable}) TO ${escapeString(nodesPath)} (FORMAT JSON)`); a",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/tools/graph-export.js",
"line": 46,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/utils/connection-reset.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/connection-reset.js:104`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/utils/connection-reset.js"
},
"evidence": "const pid = execSync(`lsof -ti :${port} 2>/dev/null || true`, { encoding: 'utf-8',",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/utils/connection-reset.js",
"line": 104,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/federation/ResourceRegistry.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/federation/ResourceRegistry.js:218`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/federation/ResourceRegistry.js"
},
"evidence": "persistence */ import(data) { this.clearAll(); // Restore resources for (const [key, re",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "dist/federation/ResourceRegistry.js",
"line": 218,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/port-manager.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/port-manager.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/port-manager.js"
},
"evidence": "execSync, spawn } from 'child_process' import net from 'net' /** * Port Management Utility * Handles port cleanup, pr",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "scripts/port-manager.js",
"line": 3,
"nonRuntime": true
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "query_duckdb",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"execute_sql\"",
"parameter \"sql\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "list_tables",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "describe_table",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "load_csv",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "load_parquet",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "attach_mcp",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "detach_mcp",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_attached_servers",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_mcp_resources",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_virtual_table",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "drop_virtual_table",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_virtual_tables",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "refresh_virtual_table",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "query_hybrid",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"parameter \"sql\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "federate_query",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"parameter \"sql\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "ducklake.attach",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ducklake.snapshots",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ducklake.time_travel",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "analyze_data",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "table_name",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "columns",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ducklake_time_travel",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "catalog_name",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "timestamp",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "migrate_to_ducklake",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "source_path",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "optimize_query",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "query",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"sql_query\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "data_quality_check",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "checks",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "d443996f915fb5d1d314b12a55f4bda2f108c2516e2176e3eb056d1e7ef8ca8e",
"stats": {
"tools": 30,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 3,
"medium": 4,
"low": 1,
"info": 0
}
}
}