Security Scanner (ongjin) MCP Server
security-scanner-mcp
npm
v1.2.0
Published by ongjin — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server that scans AI-generated code for security vulnerabilities (OWASP Top 10, hardcoded secrets, SQL injection, XSS)
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/scanners/xss.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/scanners/xss.js:120`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: }, { name: 'new Function()', pattern: /new\s+Function\s*\(/gi, message: 'new Function()은 eva
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/scanners/xss.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/external/checkov-wrapper.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/external/checkov-wrapper.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: / import { exec } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import * as fs from 'fs'; import * as path fro
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/external/checkov-wrapper.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/external/gitleaks-wrapper.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/external/gitleaks-wrapper.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: / import { exec } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import * as fs from 'fs'; import * as path fro
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/external/gitleaks-wrapper.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/external/trivy-wrapper.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/external/trivy-wrapper.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: / import { exec } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import * as fs from 'fs'; import * as path fro
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/external/trivy-wrapper.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/sandbox/docker-manager.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/sandbox/docker-manager.js:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: t { exec, spawn } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import * as crypto from 'crypto'; const execAs
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/sandbox/docker-manager.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/scanners/dependencies.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/scanners/dependencies.js:14`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ; import { exec } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; const execAsync = promisify(exec); /** * 알려진
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/scanners/dependencies.js
Tools 12
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
generate-security-reportno sensitive capabilityget-fix-suggestionno sensitive capabilityscan-authno sensitive capabilityscan-cryptono sensitive capabilityscan-dependenciesno sensitive capabilityscan-iacno sensitive capabilityscan-in-sandboxno sensitive capabilityscan-injectionno sensitive capabilityscan-pathno sensitive capabilityscan-secretsno sensitive capability
Show 2 more tools ↓
scan-securityno sensitive capabilityscan-xssno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (12 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.2.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan security-scanner-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Security Scanner 7
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 8 side by side →
MCP server for comprehensive security scanning of code repositories
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Static security scanner for Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers. Detects tool-description poisoning, exfiltration cues, hidden-unicode payloads, arbitrary command execution, SSRF surface, hardcoded secrets, and rug-pull risk. Runs locally for Cursor and
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