Secretless Ai — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.5.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.5.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.4"
},
"target": {
"id": "secretless-ai",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "secretless-ai"
},
"server": {
"name": "secretless-ai"
}
},
"grade": "D",
"score": {
"score": 62,
"grade": "D",
"band": "D",
"gateCap": "D",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 38.5,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "confirmed",
"rawWeight": 22,
"confidenceMult": 1,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 22
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "confirmed",
"rawWeight": 22,
"confidenceMult": 1,
"diminishingFactor": 0.5,
"appliedPenalty": 11
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "confirmed",
"rawWeight": 22,
"confidenceMult": 1,
"diminishingFactor": 0.25,
"appliedPenalty": 5.5
}
],
"gatesFired": [
"3 confirmed high findings → grade capped at D"
],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.4"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": false,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/init.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/init.js:248`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/init.js"
},
"evidence": ".aws/credentials",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "dist/init.js",
"line": 248
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/patterns.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/patterns.js:133`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/patterns.js"
},
"evidence": ".aws/credentials",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "dist/patterns.js",
"line": 133
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/scan.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/scan.js:373`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/scan.js"
},
"evidence": "id_rsa",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "dist/scan.js",
"line": 373
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"title": "Hardcoded AWS access key id in server code (dist/patterns.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "confirmed",
"description": "A live-looking AWS access key id is hardcoded in `dist/patterns.js:103`. Secrets in source ship to everyone who installs the package and are a direct credential leak.",
"remediation": "Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/patterns.js"
},
"evidence": "AWS access key id: AKIA…(redacted)",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"secretType": "aws-access-key",
"file": "dist/patterns.js",
"line": 103
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"title": "Hardcoded AWS access key id in server code (dist/scan.d.ts)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "confirmed",
"description": "A live-looking AWS access key id is hardcoded in `dist/scan.d.ts:71`. Secrets in source ship to everyone who installs the package and are a direct credential leak.",
"remediation": "Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/scan.d.ts"
},
"evidence": "AWS access key id: AKIA…(redacted)",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"secretType": "aws-access-key",
"file": "dist/scan.d.ts",
"line": 71
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"title": "Hardcoded AWS access key id in server code (dist/scan.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "confirmed",
"description": "A live-looking AWS access key id is hardcoded in `dist/scan.js:132`. Secrets in source ship to everyone who installs the package and are a direct credential leak.",
"remediation": "Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/scan.js"
},
"evidence": "AWS access key id: AKIA…(redacted)",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"secretType": "aws-access-key",
"file": "dist/scan.js",
"line": 132
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/backends/factory.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/backends/factory.js:50`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/backends/factory.js"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/backends/factory.js",
"line": 50
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/backends/keychain-linux.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/backends/keychain-linux.js:51`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/backends/keychain-linux.js"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/backends/keychain-linux.js",
"line": 51
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/backends/keychain-macos.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/backends/keychain-macos.js:49`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/backends/keychain-macos.js"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/backends/keychain-macos.js",
"line": 49
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/backends/onepassword.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/backends/onepassword.js:59`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/backends/onepassword.js"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/backends/onepassword.js",
"line": 59
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/commands/diff.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/commands/diff.js:63`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/commands/diff.js"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/commands/diff.js",
"line": 63
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/doctor.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/doctor.js:56`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/doctor.js"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/doctor.js",
"line": 56
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/mcp-wrapper.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/mcp-wrapper.js:46`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/mcp-wrapper.js"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/mcp-wrapper.js",
"line": 46
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/run.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/run.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/run.js"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/run.js",
"line": 10
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/scan-staged.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/scan-staged.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/scan-staged.js"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/scan-staged.js",
"line": 10
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/session/install.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/session/install.js:48`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/session/install.js"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/session/install.js",
"line": 48
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [],
"surfaceDigest": "6775513ffa9c60c4a450ddfd6ac4416ecdfeb354acb2447b3877b01deecda579",
"stats": {
"tools": 0,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 16,
"medium": 0,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}