Seatable MCP Server
@seatable/mcp-seatable
npm
v1.6.4
Source verified
Published by seatable — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP server for SeaTable — read, write, search, link, and query data in your bases
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: download_file → query_sql → add_row. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow download_file → query_sql → add_row
medium Tool "unlink_rows" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "unlink_rows" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "unlink" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool unlink_rows
low Mutating tool "unlink_rows" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "unlink_rows" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool unlink_rows
Tools 23
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
add_rownetwork egressappend_rowsnetwork egressdownload_fileingests untrusted inputquery_sqlreads sensitive dataunlink_rowswrites filesupdate_rowsnetwork egressupload_filenetwork egressupsert_rowsnetwork egressadd_select_optionsno sensitive capabilitycreate_snapshotno sensitive capability
Show 13 more tools ↓
delete_rowsno sensitive capabilityecho_argsno sensitive capabilityfind_rowsno sensitive capabilityget_rowno sensitive capabilityget_row_activitiesno sensitive capabilityget_schemano sensitive capabilitylink_rowsno sensitive capabilitylist_basesno sensitive capabilitylist_collaboratorsno sensitive capabilitylist_rowsno sensitive capabilitylist_tablesno sensitive capabilityping_seatableno sensitive capabilitysearch_rowsno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (23 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 4
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.6.4 latest |
A 94/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v1.6.1 |
A 94/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-04 |
v1.6.0 |
A 94/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-01 |
v1.5.2 |
A 94/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @seatable/mcp-seatable --onlineOther implementations of Seatable 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
More in Other
A Model Context Protocol server implementation for AdGuard Home that enables AI agents to query and manage DNS records, filtering rules and more
Identity oracle and trust layer for autonomous AI agents. Bidirectional KYA and trust scoring.
MCP server with Airtable integration
A free one-minute reset for people, delivered by AI, with no account or personal data.
Access SEC filings efficiently, save time and tokens, and get cited answers.
A smart [MCP](https://modelcontextprotocol.io) server for [AniList](https://anilist.co) that gets your anime/manga taste - not just API calls.