Scry Connect MCP Server
scry-connect
PyPI
v1.3.0
Published by phaneron-robotics — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for ROS 2 — exposes robot capabilities as AI-callable tools
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Shell/command execution in server code (scry_connect/adapters/firewall_probe.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`scry_connect/adapters/firewall_probe.py:51`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: return subprocess.run( # noqa: S603 cmd, capture_output=True, time
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scry_connect/adapters/firewall_probe.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (scry_connect/managers/privilege.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`scry_connect/managers/privilege.py:142`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: rc = subprocess.run( [sudo, "-n", "true"], stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scry_connect/managers/privilege.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (scry_connect/managers/shell.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`scry_connect/managers/shell.py:143`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: (/])find\b.*(-delete\b|-exec(dir)?\b)", r"(^|[\s|&;(/])(reboot|shutdown|poweroff|halt|init)\b", r"(^|[\s
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scry_connect/managers/shell.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (scry_connect/managers/shell_runner.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`scry_connect/managers/shell_runner.py:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: safely: arg lists (no `shell=True`), bounded timeouts, stdout/stderr captured, exit codes reported. """ from __future_
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scry_connect/managers/shell_runner.py
low Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_export_manager.py)MTC-SRC-006
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_export_manager.py:68`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: path = _write(ssh_dir, "id_ed25519", "PRIVATE KEY\n") with pytest.raises(InvalidArgument) as e: mgr.export_f
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_export_manager.py
low Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_shell.py)MTC-SRC-006
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_shell.py:204`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: w", "cat ~/.ssh/id_rsa", "cat /home/scry/.ssh/known_hosts", "cat server.key", "cat cert.
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_shell.py
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.3.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.14.0 | 2026-09-20 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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