Screenhand — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "screenhand",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "screenhand"
},
"server": {
"name": "screenhand"
}
},
"grade": "D",
"score": {
"score": 63,
"threatScore": 74,
"grade": "D",
"band": "D",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 24.85,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 1.2,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.5,
"appliedPenalty": 3.15
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-011",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 22,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 15.4
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-010",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 1.2
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "critical",
"label": "capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 10
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "critical",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can execute shell commands or code",
"untrusted input can reach code execution"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"external-sink",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (84 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"title": "Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (dist/mcp-desktop.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/mcp-desktop.js:3595`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/mcp-desktop.js"
},
"evidence": "// dynamic AppleScript eval (can construct blocked commands) /do\\s+script/i, // Terminal.app shell execution",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-010",
"file": "dist/mcp-desktop.js",
"line": 3595,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-011",
"title": "Assembled command execution and dynamic evaluation in the same server",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "The implementation both builds shell commands out of runtime values (`dist/mcp-desktop.js`) and evaluates runtime values as code (`dist/mcp-desktop.js`). Each is a separate arbitrary-execution primitive; a server exposing both gives anything that reaches either one a direct path to running attacker-chosen code.",
"remediation": "Remove the dynamic eval, and pass command arguments as an argv array instead of building a shell string. If both are genuinely required, constrain and validate every value that can reach them.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/mcp-desktop.js"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rules": [
"MTC-SRC-009",
"MTC-SRC-010"
],
"commandFile": "dist/mcp-desktop.js",
"evalFile": "dist/mcp-desktop.js",
"sameFile": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/mcp-desktop.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/mcp-desktop.js:3595`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/mcp-desktop.js"
},
"evidence": "// dynamic AppleScript eval (can construct blocked commands) /do\\s+script/i, // Terminal.app shell execution",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "dist/mcp-desktop.js",
"line": 3595,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/mcp-desktop.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/mcp-desktop.js:37`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/mcp-desktop.js"
},
"evidence": "Sync, exec } from \"node:child_process\"; import { promisify } from \"node:util\"; const execAsync = promisify(exec); import",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/mcp-desktop.js",
"line": 37,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/src/jobs/runner.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/src/jobs/runner.js:587`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/src/jobs/runner.js"
},
"evidence": "} = await import(\"node:child_process\"); execSync(`open ${JSON.stringify(url)}`, { timeout: 10_000 });",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/src/jobs/runner.js",
"line": 587,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/src/native/bridge-client.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/src/native/bridge-client.js:17`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/src/native/bridge-client.js"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from \"node:child_process\"; import { EventEmitter } from \"node:events\"; import fs from \"node:fs\"; import pat",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/src/native/bridge-client.js",
"line": 17,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/src/runtime/applescript-adapter.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/src/runtime/applescript-adapter.js:17`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/src/runtime/applescript-adapter.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execFile } from \"node:child_process\"; import { randomUUID } from \"node:crypto\"; import { promisify } from \"node:util\";",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/src/runtime/applescript-adapter.js",
"line": 17,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/src/test-mcp-protocol.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/src/test-mcp-protocol.js:17`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/src/test-mcp-protocol.js"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from \"node:child_process\"; import { createInterface } from \"node:readline\"; import path from \"node:path\"; i",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/src/test-mcp-protocol.js",
"line": 17,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/src/util/sanitize.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/src/util/sanitize.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/src/util/sanitize.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import os from \"node:os\"; const MAX_STRING_LENGTH = 1000; const ALLOWED_URL_PROT",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/src/util/sanitize.js",
"line": 7,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-005",
"title": "Untrusted input can drive an external action",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Untrusted-input tools ([platform_learn]) co-exist with external-action tools ([applescript]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.",
"remediation": "Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "platform_learn → applescript"
},
"evidence": "untrusted [platform_learn] → sinks [applescript]",
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"platform_learn"
],
"sinks": [
"applescript"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/src/memory/research.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/src/memory/research.js:60`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/src/memory/research.js"
},
"evidence": "const response = await fetch(\"https://api.anthropic.com/v1/messages\", { method: \"POST\", headers",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/src/memory/research.js",
"line": 60,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/src/planner/planner.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/src/planner/planner.js:967`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/src/planner/planner.js"
},
"evidence": "const response = await fetch(\"https://api.anthropic.com/v1/messages\", { method: \"POST\",",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/src/planner/planner.js",
"line": 967,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/src/state/visual-mapper.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/src/state/visual-mapper.js:124`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/src/state/visual-mapper.js"
},
"evidence": "const resp = await fetch(\"https://api.anthropic.com/v1/messages\", { method: \"POST\", headers",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/src/state/visual-mapper.js",
"line": 124,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/mcp-desktop.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/mcp-desktop.js:3612`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/mcp-desktop.js"
},
"evidence": "const result = execSync(`osascript -e '${script.replace(/'/g, \"'\\\\''\")}'`, { encoding: \"utf-8\",",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/mcp-desktop.js",
"line": 3612,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/src/jobs/runner.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/src/jobs/runner.js:588`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/src/jobs/runner.js"
},
"evidence": "_process\"); execSync(`open ${JSON.stringify(url)}`, { timeout: 10_000 }); return { ok: true, met",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/src/jobs/runner.js",
"line": 588,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/scripts/supervisor-daemon.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/scripts/supervisor-daemon.js:127`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/scripts/supervisor-daemon.js"
},
"evidence": "} = await import(\"node:child_process\"); const msg = recovery.instruction.replace(/\"/g, '\\\\\"');",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/scripts/supervisor-daemon.js",
"line": 127,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/postinstall.cjs)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/postinstall.cjs:12`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/postinstall.cjs"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } = require(\"child_process\"); const fs = require(\"fs\"); const path = require(\"path\"); const platform = proce",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "scripts/postinstall.cjs",
"line": 12,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-010",
"title": "Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "\"screenhand\" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.",
"remediation": "Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "screenhand"
},
"evidence": "node scripts/postinstall.cjs",
"owasp": "LLM03:2025 Supply Chain",
"references": [
"https://github.com/ossf/package-analysis",
"https://owasp.org/www-project-top-10-ci-cd-security-risks/"
],
"data": {
"scripts": [
"postinstall"
]
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"platform_learn"
],
"sensitiveSource": [],
"externalSink": [
"applescript"
],
"selfContained": false,
"description": "Untrusted input can drive an external action even though no sensitive source is exposed."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "apps",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "windows",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "focus",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "launch",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "screenshot",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "screenshot_file",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ocr",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ui_tree",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ui_find",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ui_press",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ui_set_value",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "menu_click",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "click",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "click_text",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "type_text",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "key",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "drag",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "scroll",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_tabs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_open",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_navigate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_js",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_dom",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_click",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_type",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "browser_wait",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
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