Scrcpy MCP Server
scrcpy-mcp
npm
v0.5.0
Source verified
Published by juancf — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP server for Android device control via ADB and scrcpy — gives AI agents vision and control over Android devices
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([ui_dump]) and tools that can send data out ([shell_exec]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [ui_dump] → sinks [shell_exec]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow ui_dump → shell_exec
high Tool "shell_exec" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "shell_exec" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name, parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool shell_exec
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execFile } from "child_process"; import { promisify } from "util"; // src/utils/constants.ts var ADB_PATH = proc
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "shell_exec"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "shell_exec" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool shell_exec · inputSchema.properties.command
low Mutating tool "shell_exec" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "shell_exec" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool shell_exec
Tools 39
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
shell_execruns code / shellui_dumpreads sensitive dataapp_currentno sensitive capabilityapp_installno sensitive capabilityapp_listno sensitive capabilityapp_startno sensitive capabilityapp_stopno sensitive capabilityapp_uninstallno sensitive capabilityclipboard_getno sensitive capabilityclipboard_setno sensitive capability
Show 29 more tools ↓
collapse_panelsno sensitive capabilityconnect_wifino sensitive capabilitydevice_infono sensitive capabilitydevice_listno sensitive capabilitydisconnect_wifino sensitive capabilitydrag_dropno sensitive capabilityexpand_notificationsno sensitive capabilityexpand_settingsno sensitive capabilityfile_listno sensitive capabilityfile_pullno sensitive capabilityfile_pushno sensitive capabilityinput_textno sensitive capabilitykey_eventno sensitive capabilitylong_pressno sensitive capabilityrotate_deviceno sensitive capabilityscreen_offno sensitive capabilityscreen_onno sensitive capabilityscreen_record_startno sensitive capabilityscreen_record_stopno sensitive capabilityscreenshotno sensitive capabilityscrollno sensitive capabilitystart_sessionno sensitive capabilitystart_video_streamno sensitive capabilitystop_sessionno sensitive capabilitystop_video_streamno sensitive capabilityswipeno sensitive capabilitytapno sensitive capabilityui_find_elementno sensitive capabilityversionno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (39 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 3
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.5.0 latest |
A 94/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.4.1 |
A 94/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-20 |
v0.4.0 |
A 94/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-12 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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