Scrapely MCP Server

scrapely-mcp npm v1.4.0

Published by deepblue6 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.

Trust grade
A
96/100
Last scanned
Trust
A · 96/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
Moderate
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 96/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−3 capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−1 publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable
inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 1

medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005

Untrusted-input tools ([get_scraping_source_leads, fetch_conversations]) co-exist with external-action tools ([schedule_tweet, cancel_scheduled_tweet]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.

Evidence: untrusted [get_scraping_source_leads, fetch_conversations] → sinks [schedule_tweet, cancel_scheduled_tweet]

Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.

Location: flow get_scraping_source_leads → schedule_tweet

Tools 29

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • cancel_scheduled_tweetnetwork egress
  • fetch_conversationsingests untrusted input
  • get_scraping_source_leadsingests untrusted input
  • schedule_tweetnetwork egress
  • add_accountno sensitive capability
  • check_scraping_statusno sensitive capability
  • create_scraping_sourceno sensitive capability
  • enrich_emailno sensitive capability
  • enrich_twitterno sensitive capability
  • get_account_tagsno sensitive capability
  • get_campaign_analyticsno sensitive capability
  • get_campaign_detailno sensitive capability
  • get_crm_datano sensitive capability
  • get_enrichment_creditsno sensitive capability
  • get_webhook_infono sensitive capability
  • launch_campaignno sensitive capability
  • list_accountsno sensitive capability
  • list_campaignsno sensitive capability
  • list_scheduled_tweetsno sensitive capability
  • remove_accountno sensitive capability
  • send_dmno sensitive capability
  • set_account_tagsno sensitive capability
  • toggle_followups_pauseno sensitive capability
  • toggle_pauseno sensitive capability
  • toggle_warmupno sensitive capability
  • update_account_tagsno sensitive capability
  • update_cookiesno sensitive capability
  • update_crmno sensitive capability
  • update_proxyno sensitive capability

Toxic flows 1

Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).

What this scan could not see

Versions

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v1.4.0 latest A 96/100 1 1.8.0 2026-07-23

Embed this score

Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: A · 96/100
Markdown (GitHub README)
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan scrapely-mcp --online

Use the free API → How scoring works

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