Scitex Scholar MCP Server
scitex-scholar
PyPI
v1.7.1
Published by ywatanabe1989 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 11 = 89. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
| ✓ | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 16
high Dynamic code execution in server code (src/scitex_scholar/_sphinx_html/_static/doctools.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_scholar/_sphinx_html/_static/doctools.js:60`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: new Function(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/scitex_scholar/_sphinx_html/_static/doctools.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/scitex_scholar/_cli/gui.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_scholar/_cli/gui.py:107`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.Popen(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/scitex_scholar/_cli/gui.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/scitex_scholar/_cli/library.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_scholar/_cli/library.py:867`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/scitex_scholar/_cli/library.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/scitex_scholar/_mcp/job_handlers.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_scholar/_mcp/job_handlers.py:33`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/scitex_scholar/_mcp/job_handlers.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/scitex_scholar/_utils/cleanup/_cleanup_scholar_processes.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_scholar/_utils/cleanup/_cleanup_scholar_processes.py:32`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/scitex_scholar/_utils/cleanup/_cleanup_scholar_processes.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/scitex_scholar/browser/ScholarBrowserManager.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_scholar/browser/ScholarBrowserManager.py:274`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/scitex_scholar/browser/ScholarBrowserManager.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/scitex_scholar/cli/handlers/project_handler.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_scholar/cli/handlers/project_handler.py:38`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/scitex_scholar/cli/handlers/project_handler.py
low Unconstrained path parameter "bibtex_path" on "resolve_dois"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "resolve_dois" takes a path parameter "bibtex_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool resolve_dois · inputSchema.properties.bibtex_path
low Unconstrained path parameter "bibtex_path" on "enrich_bibtex"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "enrich_bibtex" takes a path parameter "bibtex_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool enrich_bibtex · inputSchema.properties.bibtex_path
low Unconstrained path parameter "output_path" on "enrich_bibtex"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "enrich_bibtex" takes a path parameter "output_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool enrich_bibtex · inputSchema.properties.output_path
low Unconstrained path parameter "bibtex_path" on "parse_bibtex"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "parse_bibtex" takes a path parameter "bibtex_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool parse_bibtex · inputSchema.properties.bibtex_path
low Unconstrained path parameter "output_path" on "export_papers"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "export_papers" takes a path parameter "output_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool export_papers · inputSchema.properties.output_path
low Unconstrained path parameter "bibtex_path" on "fetch_papers"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "fetch_papers" takes a path parameter "bibtex_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool fetch_papers · inputSchema.properties.bibtex_path
low Unconstrained path parameter "bibtex_path" on "download_pdfs_batch"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "download_pdfs_batch" takes a path parameter "bibtex_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool download_pdfs_batch · inputSchema.properties.bibtex_path
low Unconstrained path parameter "output_dir" on "download_pdfs_batch"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "download_pdfs_batch" takes a path parameter "output_dir" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool download_pdfs_batch · inputSchema.properties.output_dir
low Unconstrained path parameter "bibtex_path" on "add_papers_to_project"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "add_papers_to_project" takes a path parameter "bibtex_path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool add_papers_to_project · inputSchema.properties.bibtex_path
Tools 34
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
download_pdfs_batchingests untrusted inputreads sensitive datafetch_papersingests untrusted inputreads sensitive dataadd_papers_to_projectreads sensitive datadownload_pdfingests untrusted inputenrich_bibtexreads sensitive dataexport_papersreads sensitive dataparse_bibtexreads sensitive dataresolve_doisreads sensitive dataauthenticateno sensitive capabilitycancel_jobno sensitive capabilitycheck_auth_statusno sensitive capabilitycreate_projectno sensitive capabilitycrossref_citationsno sensitive capabilitycrossref_countno sensitive capabilitycrossref_getno sensitive capabilitycrossref_infono sensitive capabilitycrossref_searchno sensitive capabilityget_job_resultno sensitive capabilityget_job_statusno sensitive capabilityget_library_statusno sensitive capabilitylist_jobsno sensitive capabilitylist_projectsno sensitive capabilitylogoutno sensitive capabilityopenalex_countno sensitive capabilityopenalex_getno sensitive capabilityopenalex_infono sensitive capabilityopenalex_searchno sensitive capabilityparse_pdf_contentno sensitive capabilityresolve_openurlsno sensitive capabilityscholar_skills_getno sensitive capabilityscholar_skills_listno sensitive capabilitysearch_papersno sensitive capabilitystart_jobno sensitive capabilityvalidate_pdfsno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (34 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.7.1 latest |
B 89/100 | 16 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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