Scitex Hub MCP Server
scitex-hub
PyPI
v0.19.0
Published by ywatanabe1989 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 11 = 89. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
| ✓ | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 25
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: api_crossref_by_doi → api_project_list_files → cloud_sdk_jobs_cancel. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow api_crossref_by_doi → api_project_list_files → cloud_sdk_jobs_cancel
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (src/scitex_hub/_cli/ssh.py)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_hub/_cli/ssh.py:128`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ~/.ssh
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/scitex_hub/_cli/ssh.py
high Tool "repo_status" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "repo_status" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "shell"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool repo_status
high Tool "onsite_eval_js" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "onsite_eval_js" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "eval"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool onsite_eval_js
high Tool "cloud_sdk_jobs_status" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "cloud_sdk_jobs_status" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "subprocess"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool cloud_sdk_jobs_status
high Tool "cloud_sdk_jobs_cancel" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "cloud_sdk_jobs_cancel" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "subprocess"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool cloud_sdk_jobs_cancel
high Tool "cloud_sdk_jobs_list" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "cloud_sdk_jobs_list" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "subprocess"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool cloud_sdk_jobs_list
high Dynamic code execution in server code (src/scitex_hub/appmaker/_validate.py)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_hub/appmaker/_validate.py:24`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: eval(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/scitex_hub/appmaker/_validate.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/scitex_hub/_cli/_gitea_collab.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_hub/_cli/_gitea_collab.py:84`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/scitex_hub/_cli/_gitea_collab.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/scitex_hub/_cli/_gitea_repo.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_hub/_cli/_gitea_repo.py:46`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/scitex_hub/_cli/_gitea_repo.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/scitex_hub/_cli/_gitea_utils.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_hub/_cli/_gitea_utils.py:93`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/scitex_hub/_cli/_gitea_utils.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/scitex_hub/_cli/_sync_engine.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_hub/_cli/_sync_engine.py:91`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/scitex_hub/_cli/_sync_engine.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/scitex_hub/_cli/_workspace_cmds.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_hub/_cli/_workspace_cmds.py:38`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/scitex_hub/_cli/_workspace_cmds.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/scitex_hub/_cli/ssh.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_hub/_cli/ssh.py:157`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.call(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/scitex_hub/_cli/ssh.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/scitex_hub/_cli/sync.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_hub/_cli/sync.py:66`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/scitex_hub/_cli/sync.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/scitex_hub/_mcp_tools/gitea.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_hub/_mcp_tools/gitea.py:27`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/scitex_hub/_mcp_tools/gitea.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/scitex_hub/_utils/_docker.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_hub/_utils/_docker.py:48`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/scitex_hub/_utils/_docker.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/scitex_hub/appmaker/_deps.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/scitex_hub/appmaker/_deps.py:123`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/scitex_hub/appmaker/_deps.py
medium Tool "cloud_sdk_files_upload" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "cloud_sdk_files_upload" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "put_object"). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool cloud_sdk_files_upload
low Mutating tool "repo_status" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "repo_status" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool repo_status
low Mutating tool "onsite_eval_js" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "onsite_eval_js" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool onsite_eval_js
low Mutating tool "cloud_sdk_files_upload" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "cloud_sdk_files_upload" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool cloud_sdk_files_upload
low Mutating tool "cloud_sdk_jobs_status" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "cloud_sdk_jobs_status" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool cloud_sdk_jobs_status
low Mutating tool "cloud_sdk_jobs_cancel" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "cloud_sdk_jobs_cancel" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool cloud_sdk_jobs_cancel
low Mutating tool "cloud_sdk_jobs_list" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "cloud_sdk_jobs_list" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool cloud_sdk_jobs_list
Tools 55
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
api_project_list_filesingests untrusted inputreads sensitive dataapi_crossref_by_doiingests untrusted inputcloud_sdk_data_getingests untrusted inputcloud_sdk_files_downloadingests untrusted inputcloud_sdk_files_uploadwrites filescloud_sdk_jobs_cancelruns code / shellcloud_sdk_jobs_listruns code / shellcloud_sdk_jobs_statusruns code / shellonsite_eval_jsruns code / shellrepo_pullingests untrusted inputrepo_statusruns code / shellapi_crossref_searchno sensitive capabilityapi_enrich_bibtexno sensitive capabilityapi_project_commitno sensitive capabilityapi_scholar_searchno sensitive capabilityapi_statusno sensitive capabilityapi_writer_compileno sensitive capabilityapi_writer_list_sectionsno sensitive capabilityapp_check_depsno sensitive capabilityapp_get_currentno sensitive capabilityapp_get_infono sensitive capabilityapp_get_prefsno sensitive capabilityapp_list_allno sensitive capabilityapp_set_prefsno sensitive capabilityapp_switch_tono sensitive capabilitycloud_sdk_data_createno sensitive capabilitycloud_sdk_data_deleteno sensitive capabilitycloud_sdk_data_listno sensitive capabilitycloud_sdk_data_searchno sensitive capabilitycloud_sdk_data_updateno sensitive capabilitycloud_sdk_files_deleteno sensitive capabilitycloud_sdk_files_listno sensitive capabilitycloud_sdk_jobs_submitno sensitive capabilityonsite_capture_pageno sensitive capabilityonsite_check_permissionno sensitive capabilityonsite_get_contextno sensitive capabilityonsite_get_dev_app_urlno sensitive capabilityonsite_ui_actionno sensitive capabilityproject_createno sensitive capabilityproject_deleteno sensitive capabilityproject_listno sensitive capabilityproject_renameno sensitive capabilityproject_switchno sensitive capabilityrepo_cloneno sensitive capabilityrepo_createno sensitive capabilityrepo_deleteno sensitive capabilityrepo_forkno sensitive capabilityrepo_issue_createno sensitive capabilityrepo_issue_listno sensitive capabilityrepo_listno sensitive capabilityrepo_loginno sensitive capabilityrepo_pr_createno sensitive capabilityrepo_pr_listno sensitive capabilityrepo_pushno sensitive capabilityrepo_searchno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (55 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.19.0 latest |
B 89/100 | 25 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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