Satsignal — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.8.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.8.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.8"
},
"target": {
"id": "satsignal-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "satsignal-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "satsignal-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.8"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (10 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (src/satsignal_mcp/node_bridge.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/satsignal_mcp/node_bridge.py:118`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/satsignal_mcp/node_bridge.py"
},
"evidence": "dict(os.environ)",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "src/satsignal_mcp/node_bridge.py",
"line": 118
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/satsignal_mcp/node_bridge.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/satsignal_mcp/node_bridge.py:162`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/satsignal_mcp/node_bridge.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/satsignal_mcp/node_bridge.py",
"line": 162
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"anchor_file\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"anchor_file\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "anchor_file",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"bundle_path\" on \"chain_confirm_bundle\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"chain_confirm_bundle\" takes a path parameter \"bundle_path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "chain_confirm_bundle",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.bundle_path"
},
"data": {
"param": "bundle_path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"chain_confirm_bundle\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"chain_confirm_bundle\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "chain_confirm_bundle",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"file_path\" on \"verify_file_against_bundle\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"verify_file_against_bundle\" takes a path parameter \"file_path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "verify_file_against_bundle",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.file_path"
},
"data": {
"param": "file_path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"bundle_path\" on \"verify_file_against_bundle\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"verify_file_against_bundle\" takes a path parameter \"bundle_path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "verify_file_against_bundle",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.bundle_path"
},
"data": {
"param": "bundle_path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"verify_bundle\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"verify_bundle\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "verify_bundle",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"disclosure_mbnt_path\" on \"verify_disclosure\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"verify_disclosure\" takes a path parameter \"disclosure_mbnt_path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "verify_disclosure",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.disclosure_mbnt_path"
},
"data": {
"param": "disclosure_mbnt_path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"view_path\" on \"verify_disclosure\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"verify_disclosure\" takes a path parameter \"view_path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "verify_disclosure",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.view_path"
},
"data": {
"param": "view_path"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "anchor_file",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"parameter \"path\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "anchor_text",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "anchor_json",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "lookup_hash",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "chain_confirm_bundle",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"parameter \"path\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "verify_file_against_bundle",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"parameter \"path\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "verify_bundle",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"parameter \"path\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "anchor_disclosable",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_disclosure",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "verify_disclosure",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"parameter \"path\""
]
}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "d45df0a2ac6ee9bc342341014b69c3ca47ca7ed53e3f5842d6f29031b8b2036a",
"stats": {
"tools": 10,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 2,
"medium": 0,
"low": 8,
"info": 0
}
}
}