Sap Datasphere (MarioDeFelipe) MCP Server
sap-datasphere-mcp
PyPI
v2.0.3
Published by mariodefelipe — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Model Context Protocol server for SAP Datasphere — 48 tools, Streamable HTTP, and built-in config-driven PII/sensitive-field masking (fail-closed, audit-logged).
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Shell/command execution in server code (sap_datasphere_mcp_server.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`sap_datasphere_mcp_server.py:3187`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: result = subprocess.run( ["datasphere", "dbusers", "list", "--space", space_id],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server sap_datasphere_mcp_server.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_no_live_tenant_data.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_no_live_tenant_data.py:158`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: bprocess tracked = subprocess.run( ["git", "ls-files"], cwd=REPO, capture_output=True, text=True ).stdo
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_no_live_tenant_data.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_sdk_v2_protocol.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_sdk_v2_protocol.py:214`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ckname()[1] proc = subprocess.Popen( [sys.executable, "-m", "sap_datasphere_mcp_server", "--transp
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_sdk_v2_protocol.py
Tools 49
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
browse_marketplaceingests untrusted inputexecute_queryreads sensitive datalist_repository_objectsingests untrusted inputanalyze_column_distributionno sensitive capabilitycreate_database_userno sensitive capabilitydelete_database_userno sensitive capabilityfind_assets_by_columnno sensitive capabilityget_analytical_metadatano sensitive capabilityget_analytical_modelno sensitive capabilityget_analytical_service_documentno sensitive capability
Show 39 more tools ↓
get_asset_by_compound_keyno sensitive capabilityget_asset_detailsno sensitive capabilityget_asset_variablesno sensitive capabilityget_available_scopesno sensitive capabilityget_catalog_metadatano sensitive capabilityget_consumption_metadatano sensitive capabilityget_current_userno sensitive capabilityget_deployed_objectsno sensitive capabilityget_object_definitionno sensitive capabilityget_relational_entity_metadatano sensitive capabilityget_relational_metadatano sensitive capabilityget_relational_odata_serviceno sensitive capabilityget_repository_search_metadatano sensitive capabilityget_space_assetsno sensitive capabilityget_space_infono sensitive capabilityget_table_schemano sensitive capabilityget_task_historyno sensitive capabilityget_task_logno sensitive capabilityget_task_statusno sensitive capabilityget_tenant_infono sensitive capabilitylist_analytical_datasetsno sensitive capabilitylist_catalog_assetsno sensitive capabilitylist_connectionsno sensitive capabilitylist_database_usersno sensitive capabilitylist_relational_entitiesno sensitive capabilitylist_spacesno sensitive capabilityquery_analytical_datano sensitive capabilityquery_relational_entityno sensitive capabilityreset_database_user_passwordno sensitive capabilityrun_task_chainno sensitive capabilitysearch_catalogno sensitive capabilitysearch_repositoryno sensitive capabilitysearch_tablesno sensitive capabilitysmart_queryno sensitive capabilitytest_analytical_endpointsno sensitive capabilitytest_connectionno sensitive capabilitytest_phase67_endpointsno sensitive capabilitytest_phase8_endpointsno sensitive capabilityupdate_database_userno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (49 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 5
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.0.3 latest |
A 93/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v2.0.2 |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-12 |
v2.0.1 |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-09 |
v1.5.2 |
A 93/100 | 1 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-31 |
v1.5.1 |
A 93/100 | 1 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan sap-datasphere-mcp --online --registry pypiOther implementations of Sap Datasphere 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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