Sandbox Studio MCP Server
sandbox-studio-mcp
npm
v1.0.3
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
A local MCP server for the Sandbox Studio API
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Tool "update_cleanup_hook" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "update_cleanup_hook" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool update_cleanup_hook
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([list_accounts, list_unregistered_accounts, get_account_lease_history, list_approvals, list_events, list_leases, list_public_templates, list_managed_templates, get_template_leases, list_users, list_groups]) co-exist with external-action tools ([update_cleanup_hook]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [list_accounts, list_unregistered_accounts, get_account_lease_history, list_approvals, list_events, list_leases, list_public_templates, list_managed_t
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow list_accounts → update_cleanup_hook
medium Unconstrained command parameter "script" on "update_cleanup_hook"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "update_cleanup_hook" takes a command-shaped parameter "script" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool update_cleanup_hook · inputSchema.properties.script
low Mutating tool "update_cleanup_hook" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "update_cleanup_hook" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool update_cleanup_hook
Tools 81
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_account_lease_historyingests untrusted inputget_template_leasesingests untrusted inputlist_accountsingests untrusted inputlist_approvalsingests untrusted inputlist_eventsingests untrusted inputlist_groupsingests untrusted inputlist_leasesingests untrusted inputlist_managed_templatesingests untrusted inputlist_public_templatesingests untrusted inputlist_unregistered_accountsingests untrusted input
Show 71 more tools ↓
list_usersingests untrusted inputupdate_cleanup_hookruns code / shelladd_event_teamsno sensitive capabilityassign_event_team_ownerno sensitive capabilitycreate_eventno sensitive capabilitycreate_oauth_clientno sensitive capabilitycreate_templateno sensitive capabilitydelete_oauth_clientno sensitive capabilitydelete_templateno sensitive capabilityeject_accountsno sensitive capabilityget_accountno sensitive capabilityget_account_cleanup_logsno sensitive capabilityget_account_failed_resourcesno sensitive capabilityget_cleanup_hookno sensitive capabilityget_cleanup_settingsno sensitive capabilityget_email_settingsno sensitive capabilityget_eventno sensitive capabilityget_event_teamsno sensitive capabilityget_global_configno sensitive capabilityget_leaseno sensitive capabilityget_lease_costsno sensitive capabilityget_lease_logsno sensitive capabilityget_lease_secretsno sensitive capabilityget_lease_team_membersno sensitive capabilityget_runtime_configno sensitive capabilityget_smtp_settingsno sensitive capabilityget_tagsno sensitive capabilityget_templateno sensitive capabilityget_template_infono sensitive capabilityget_template_launch_settingsno sensitive capabilityget_template_permissionsno sensitive capabilityget_terms_of_serviceno sensitive capabilityget_terms_versionno sensitive capabilityimport_accountsno sensitive capabilitylist_all_oauth_clientsno sensitive capabilitylist_my_oauth_clientsno sensitive capabilitylist_terms_versionsno sensitive capabilityprovision_eventno sensitive capabilitypublish_terms_of_serviceno sensitive capabilityrequest_leaseno sensitive capabilityresume_leaseno sensitive capabilityretry_account_cleanupno sensitive capabilityreview_leaseno sensitive capabilitysend_test_emailno sensitive capabilityshare_leaseno sensitive capabilitystart_eventno sensitive capabilitysuspend_leaseno sensitive capabilityterminate_eventno sensitive capabilityterminate_leaseno sensitive capabilitytrigger_drift_detectionno sensitive capabilitytrigger_lease_monitoringno sensitive capabilityunshare_leaseno sensitive capabilityupdate_cleanup_settingsno sensitive capabilityupdate_email_settingsno sensitive capabilityupdate_eventno sensitive capabilityupdate_global_configno sensitive capabilityupdate_leaseno sensitive capabilityupdate_oauth_clientno sensitive capabilityupdate_preferencesno sensitive capabilityupdate_smtp_settingsno sensitive capabilityupdate_template_budgetno sensitive capabilityupdate_template_durationno sensitive capabilityupdate_template_infono sensitive capabilityupdate_template_launch_settingsno sensitive capabilityupdate_template_managersno sensitive capabilityupdate_template_permissionsno sensitive capabilityupdate_template_sharingno sensitive capabilityupdate_template_tagsno sensitive capabilityvalidate_s3_pathno sensitive capabilityvalidate_usersno sensitive capabilitywithdraw_leaseno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (81 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.3 latest |
A 92/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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