Samp MCP Server
samp-mcp
npm
v1.0.12
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
An MCP server for Managing SAMP (San Andreas Multiplayer) servers with Thai (Windows-874) support.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 12 = 82. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/filetools.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/filetools.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { Client } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/client/index.js"; import { Std
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/filetools.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/scripts.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/scripts.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ; import { exec } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import * as path from 'path'; import iconv fro
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/scripts.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/scripts.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/scripts.js:277`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: erExePath); exec(`"${this.serverExePath}"`, { cwd: serverDir }); return 'Server started';
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/scripts.js
Tools 51
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
install_includeingests untrusted inputupdate_file_toolsingests untrusted inputweb_searchingests untrusted inputaaa_mandatory_read_first_guidelinesno sensitive capabilityaudit_performanceno sensitive capabilityaudit_scriptno sensitive capabilityaudit_sqlno sensitive capabilitycheck_for_updatesno sensitive capabilitycheck_includesno sensitive capabilitycompile_and_load_pawnno sensitive capability
Show 41 more tools ↓
compile_pawnno sensitive capabilitycreate_deploymentno sensitive capabilitydesign_featureno sensitive capabilityfile_allowed_dirsno sensitive capabilityfile_bomno sensitive capabilityfile_convert_encodingno sensitive capabilityfile_detect_encodingno sensitive capabilityfile_editno sensitive capabilityfile_encodingsno sensitive capabilityfile_grepno sensitive capabilityfile_infono sensitive capabilityfile_line_endingsno sensitive capabilityfile_listno sensitive capabilityfile_readno sensitive capabilityfile_read_manyno sensitive capabilityfile_searchno sensitive capabilityfile_treeno sensitive capabilityfile_writeno sensitive capabilityfind_shadowingno sensitive capabilitygenerate_boilerplateno sensitive capabilitygenerate_docsno sensitive capabilityget_coding_standardsno sensitive capabilityget_dashboardno sensitive capabilityget_essential_librariesno sensitive capabilityget_playersno sensitive capabilityget_rulesno sensitive capabilityget_server_diagnosticsno sensitive capabilityget_snippetno sensitive capabilityget_statusno sensitive capabilityinject_codeno sensitive capabilityinspect_projectno sensitive capabilityinstall_pluginno sensitive capabilitymanage_serverno sensitive capabilityplayer_actionno sensitive capabilityrcon_commandno sensitive capabilityreview_implementationno sensitive capabilitysearch_pluginno sensitive capabilityset_server_rootno sensitive capabilitysetup_ai_environmentno sensitive capabilitystudy_projectno sensitive capabilityupdate_mcp_serverno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (51 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.12 latest |
B 82/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v1.0.10 |
B 82/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-06 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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