Sallyport MCP Server
sallyport
PyPI
v0.16.0
Published by ginkida — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 11 = 89. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
| ✓ | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (src/sallyport_daemon/local_tools.py)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`src/sallyport_daemon/local_tools.py:130`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ~/.ssh
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/sallyport_daemon/local_tools.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/sallyport_daemon/__main__.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/sallyport_daemon/__main__.py:274`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/sallyport_daemon/__main__.py
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "fetch_in_page"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "fetch_in_page" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool fetch_in_page · inputSchema.properties.url
low Unconstrained path parameter "filename" on "print_to_pdf"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "print_to_pdf" takes a path parameter "filename" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool print_to_pdf · inputSchema.properties.filename
low Unconstrained path parameter "filename" on "save_to_file"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "save_to_file" takes a path parameter "filename" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool save_to_file · inputSchema.properties.filename
Tools 30
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
fetch_in_pageingests untrusted inputprint_to_pdfreads sensitive datasave_to_filereads sensitive dataclickno sensitive capabilityclose_tabno sensitive capabilityconsole_tailno sensitive capabilityevaluateno sensitive capabilityfillno sensitive capabilityfindno sensitive capabilityget_stateno sensitive capabilityhandle_dialogno sensitive capabilityhistory_gono sensitive capabilityhoverno sensitive capabilitykey_typeno sensitive capabilitylist_tabsno sensitive capabilitymouse_clickno sensitive capabilitynavigateno sensitive capabilitynetwork_tailno sensitive capabilityread_textno sensitive capabilityreloadno sensitive capabilityrevealno sensitive capabilityscreenshotno sensitive capabilityscrollno sensitive capabilityselect_optionno sensitive capabilitysend_keysno sensitive capabilitysettleno sensitive capabilitysnapshotno sensitive capabilitystatusno sensitive capabilityuploadno sensitive capabilitywait_forno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (30 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.16.0 latest |
B 89/100 | 5 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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