Browser Bridge (sakiko111) MCP Server
@sakiko111/browser-bridge
npm
v1.0.1
Published by @sakiko111 — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
Chrome MCP Server — AI controls your real browser with full HTML/CSS/JS access
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Dynamic code execution in server code (extension/background.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`extension/background.js:210`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: =(function(){try{return eval(' + JSON.stringify(code) + ')}catch(e){return{error:e.message}}})()'; (document.hea
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server extension/background.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (native-host/host.cjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`native-host/host.cjs:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: st { spawn } = require("child_process"); const path = require("path"); const fs = require("fs"); const MCP_DIR = path.r
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server native-host/host.cjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (setup.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`setup.mjs:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; import { copyFileSync, existsSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync, readdirSync, writeFi
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server setup.mjs
Tools 16
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
browser_clickno sensitive capabilitybrowser_close_tabno sensitive capabilitybrowser_execute_jsno sensitive capabilitybrowser_get_cookiesno sensitive capabilitybrowser_get_htmlno sensitive capabilitybrowser_get_storageno sensitive capabilitybrowser_get_textno sensitive capabilitybrowser_list_tabsno sensitive capabilitybrowser_navigateno sensitive capabilitybrowser_press_keyno sensitive capability
Show 6 more tools ↓
browser_screenshotno sensitive capabilitybrowser_scrollno sensitive capabilitybrowser_set_cookieno sensitive capabilitybrowser_switch_tabno sensitive capabilitybrowser_type_textno sensitive capabilitybrowser_wait_for_selectorno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (16 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.1 latest |
A 92/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @sakiko111/browser-bridge --onlineOther implementations of Browser Bridge 2
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 3 side by side →
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