Saiteja1123 — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@saiteja1123/mcp-server",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@saiteja1123/mcp-server"
},
"server": {
"name": "@saiteja1123/mcp-server"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (17 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (src/rule-engine/rules.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/rule-engine/rules.js:16`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/rule-engine/rules.js"
},
"evidence": "fix:'Never use eval() — arbitrary code execution', cat:'Injection'}, { id:'A005', name:'SQL Injectio",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "src/rule-engine/rules.js",
"line": 16,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (src/selftest.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/selftest.js:1993`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/selftest.js"
},
"evidence": "'remote-ok-without-data eval(\"1\")', lang: 'js', projectRoot: guard.resolvedRoot, instal",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "src/selftest.js",
"line": 1993,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/rule-engine/rules.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/rule-engine/rules.js:61`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/rule-engine/rules.js"
},
"evidence": "fix:'Avoid shell=True — use list args', cat:'Injection'}, { id:'P006', name:'Python M",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/rule-engine/rules.js",
"line": 61,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/selftest.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/selftest.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/selftest.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import fs from 'fs/promises'; import http from 'http'; import os from 'os';",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/selftest.js",
"line": 2,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (src/phase7-release-authority.test.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`src/phase7-release-authority.test.js:381`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/phase7-release-authority.test.js"
},
"evidence": "cApiKey\", key);', 'fetch(\"https://api.anthropic.com/v1/messages\", { headers: { \"x-api-key\": key } });', '</scr",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "src/phase7-release-authority.test.js",
"line": 381,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in packaging/dev tooling (src/phase7-release-authority.test.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`src/phase7-release-authority.test.js:42`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/phase7-release-authority.test.js"
},
"evidence": "errides.title || 'A004: eval() Usage', status: 'open', source: { filePath: overrides.filePath || 'apps/",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "src/phase7-release-authority.test.js",
"line": 42,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in packaging/dev tooling (src/ralph-release-validation.test.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`src/ralph-release-validation.test.js:249`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/ralph-release-validation.test.js"
},
"evidence": "nput = process.argv[2]; eval(input);\\n'); const baseline = await runDeepScan(root, localProfile()); const previous",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "src/ralph-release-validation.test.js",
"line": 249,
"nonRuntime": true
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "health",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "installDiagnostic",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "scanRepo",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "scanSummary",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "scanCurrentWorkspace",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "projectChecklist",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "buildClaudePrompt",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "deepScanStart",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "deepScanStatus",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "deepScanApprove",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "deepScanResume",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "deepScanAcceptRisk",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "deepScanRevokeAcceptedRisk",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "localScan",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "projectList",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "projectUpsert",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "scanFile",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "5e34d8baa6e60fad4256c01317be5e02ac43df92a08a50e1372d5b8fc7caf6c3",
"stats": {
"tools": 17,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 4,
"medium": 0,
"low": 3,
"info": 0
}
}
}