Safari (achiya-automation) MCP Server
safari-mcp
npm
v2.15.5
Source verified
Published by achiya-automation — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Automates Safari natively on macOS with 96 tools via AppleScript and JavaScript, with no Chrome dependency.
Every server starts at 100. These are the exact deductions the deterministic engine applied — each one reproducible, none of it an opinion or an LLM's guess:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −15.4 | Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value MTC-SRC-010 | injection |
| −6.3 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind the deduction.
Findings 7
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (safari.js)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`safari.js:3844`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: .config/gcloud
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server safari.js
high Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (extension/background.js)MTC-SRC-010
In the server's implementation (`extension/background.js:340`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: eval (
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server extension/background.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (extension/background.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`extension/background.js:340`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: eval (
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server extension/background.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`index.js:22`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (safari.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`safari.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server safari.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (scripts/postinstall.cjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`scripts/postinstall.cjs:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/postinstall.cjs
medium Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"safari-mcp" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. The large majority of malicious packages abuse install hooks to run code before you ever import them.
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package safari-mcp
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.15.5 latest |
C 78/100 | 7 | 1.5.0 | 2026-07-22 |
v2.15.4 |
D 63/100 | 8 | 1.4.2 | 2026-07-22 |
Embed this score
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Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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