Runwhen Platform MCP Server
runwhen-platform-mcp
PyPI
v2026.7.7.1
Published by runwhen-contrib — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 11 = 89. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
| ✓ | inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 8
high Tool "run_script" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "run_script" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "run_script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool run_script
high Tool "run_script_and_wait" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "run_script_and_wait" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "run_script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool run_script_and_wait
high Shell/command execution in server code (skills/build-runwhen-task/references/python-sli-template.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`skills/build-runwhen-task/references/python-sli-template.py:16`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server skills/build-runwhen-task/references/python-sli-template.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (skills/build-runwhen-task/references/python-task-template.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`skills/build-runwhen-task/references/python-task-template.py:32`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server skills/build-runwhen-task/references/python-task-template.py
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([list_skills]) co-exist with external-action tools ([run_script, run_script_and_wait]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [list_skills] → sinks [run_script, run_script_and_wait]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow list_skills → run_script
low Mutating tool "run_script" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "run_script" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool run_script
low Mutating tool "run_script_and_wait" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "run_script_and_wait" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool run_script_and_wait
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_bundled_authoring.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_bundled_authoring.py:112`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_bundled_authoring.py
Tools 45
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
list_skillsingests untrusted inputrun_scriptruns code / shellrun_script_and_waitruns code / shellcommit_slxno sensitive capabilitycreate_assistantno sensitive capabilitycreate_chat_commandno sensitive capabilitycreate_chat_ruleno sensitive capabilitycreate_knowledge_base_articleno sensitive capabilitydelete_assistantno sensitive capabilitydelete_knowledge_base_articleno sensitive capabilitydelete_slxno sensitive capabilitydeploy_registry_codebundleno sensitive capabilityget_assistantno sensitive capabilityget_chat_commandno sensitive capabilityget_chat_ruleno sensitive capabilityget_issue_detailsno sensitive capabilityget_knowledge_base_articleno sensitive capabilityget_registry_codebundleno sensitive capabilityget_run_outputno sensitive capabilityget_run_sessionsno sensitive capabilityget_run_statusno sensitive capabilityget_skillno sensitive capabilityget_slx_runbookno sensitive capabilityget_workspace_chat_configno sensitive capabilityget_workspace_config_indexno sensitive capabilityget_workspace_contextno sensitive capabilityget_workspace_issuesno sensitive capabilityget_workspace_locationsno sensitive capabilityget_workspace_secretsno sensitive capabilityget_workspace_slxsno sensitive capabilitylist_assistantsno sensitive capabilitylist_chat_commandsno sensitive capabilitylist_chat_rulesno sensitive capabilitylist_knowledge_base_articlesno sensitive capabilitylist_workspacesno sensitive capabilityrender_codecollection_skillno sensitive capabilityrun_slxno sensitive capabilitysearch_registryno sensitive capabilitysearch_workspaceno sensitive capabilityupdate_assistantno sensitive capabilityupdate_chat_commandno sensitive capabilityupdate_chat_ruleno sensitive capabilityupdate_knowledge_base_articleno sensitive capabilityvalidate_scriptno sensitive capabilityworkspace_chatno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (45 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2026.7.7.1 latest |
B 89/100 | 8 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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