Runpod MCP Server
@runpod/mcp-server
npm
v3.3.0
Source verified
Published by runpod — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP server for interacting with Runpod API
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/stdio.cjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/stdio.cjs:343`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const out = (0, import_child_process.execSync)("command -v claude", { stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "ignore"],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/stdio.cjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/wizard-FBLOZ6YM.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/wizard-FBLOZ6YM.mjs:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFileSync } from "child_process"; import * as p from "@clack/prompts"; // src/install/clients.ts import * as fs f
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/wizard-FBLOZ6YM.mjs
Tools 54
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
cancel-jobno sensitive capabilitycreate-container-registry-authno sensitive capabilitycreate-endpointno sensitive capabilitycreate-network-volumeno sensitive capabilitycreate-podno sensitive capabilitycreate-registry-delegationno sensitive capabilitycreate-templateno sensitive capabilitydelete-container-registry-authno sensitive capabilitydelete-endpointno sensitive capabilitydelete-network-volumeno sensitive capability
Show 44 more tools ↓
delete-podno sensitive capabilitydelete-registry-delegationno sensitive capabilitydelete-templateno sensitive capabilitydeploy-hub-repono sensitive capabilityendpoint-healthno sensitive capabilityget-billingno sensitive capabilityget-capacityno sensitive capabilityget-container-registry-authno sensitive capabilityget-cpu-typeno sensitive capabilityget-data-centerno sensitive capabilityget-endpointno sensitive capabilityget-gpu-typeno sensitive capabilityget-job-statusno sensitive capabilityget-network-volumeno sensitive capabilityget-podno sensitive capabilityget-templateno sensitive capabilitylist-container-registry-authsno sensitive capabilitylist-cpu-typesno sensitive capabilitylist-data-centersno sensitive capabilitylist-endpoint-releasesno sensitive capabilitylist-endpoint-workersno sensitive capabilitylist-endpointsno sensitive capabilitylist-gpu-typesno sensitive capabilitylist-hub-reposno sensitive capabilitylist-network-volumesno sensitive capabilitylist-podsno sensitive capabilitylist-public-endpointsno sensitive capabilitylist-registry-delegationsno sensitive capabilitylist-templatesno sensitive capabilitypurge-endpoint-queueno sensitive capabilityrestart-podno sensitive capabilityretry-jobno sensitive capabilityrun-endpointno sensitive capabilityrunsync-endpointno sensitive capabilityset-endpoint-gpusno sensitive capabilitystart-podno sensitive capabilitystop-podno sensitive capabilitystream-jobno sensitive capabilitystream-pod-logsno sensitive capabilitystream-worker-logsno sensitive capabilityupdate-endpointno sensitive capabilityupdate-network-volumeno sensitive capabilityupdate-podno sensitive capabilityupdate-templateno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (54 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 4
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v3.3.0 latest |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v3.2.0 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-16 |
v3.1.0 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-05 |
v2.0.0 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-29 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @runpod/mcp-server --onlineOther implementations of Runpod 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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