Rug Munch MCP Server
rug-munch-mcp
PyPI
v1.0.1
Published by cryptorugmunch — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for Rug Munch Intelligence — 19 tools for crypto token risk analysis, rug pull detection, and AI forensics
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([get_token_intelligence]) and tools that can send data out ([watch_token]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [get_token_intelligence] → sinks [watch_token]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow get_token_intelligence → watch_token
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "webhook_url" on "watch_token"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "watch_token" takes a URL/host parameter "webhook_url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool watch_token · inputSchema.properties.webhook_url
Tools 19
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_token_intelligencereads sensitive datawatch_tokennetwork egresscheck_batch_riskno sensitive capabilitycheck_blacklistno sensitive capabilitycheck_deployer_historyno sensitive capabilitycheck_scammer_walletno sensitive capabilitycheck_token_riskno sensitive capabilitycheck_token_risk_premiumno sensitive capabilityget_api_statusno sensitive capabilityget_coordinated_buysno sensitive capability
Show 9 more tools ↓
get_holder_deepdiveno sensitive capabilityget_kol_shillsno sensitive capabilityget_market_risk_indexno sensitive capabilityget_serial_ruggersno sensitive capabilityget_social_osintno sensitive capabilitymarcus_forensicsno sensitive capabilitymarcus_quickno sensitive capabilitymarcus_threadno sensitive capabilitymarcus_ultrano sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (19 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan rug-munch-mcp --online --registry pypiMore in Security & Testing
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