Rotifer MCP Server
@rotifer/mcp-server
npm
v0.19.0
Source verified
Published by rotifer-protocol — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Rotifer MCP Server — AI agents search, compare, and rank Genes (modular AI skills) from a living ecosystem of 50+ capabilities. Zero config.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/local.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/local.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; function readJson(path) { try { return JSON.parse(readFileSync(path,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/local.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/open-browser.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/open-browser.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; /** * Resolve the binary and arguments to open a URL in the default browser. *
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/open-browser.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/self-update.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/self-update.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from "node:child_process"; import { accessSync, constants, existsSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync, writeFileSy
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/self-update.js
Tools 46
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
arena_submitingests untrusted inputGene Download Statisticsingests untrusted inputget_gene_statsingests untrusted inputagent_runno sensitive capabilityauth_statusno sensitive capabilitycompare_genesno sensitive capabilitycompile_geneno sensitive capabilitycreate_agentno sensitive capabilityCreator Profileno sensitive capabilitydoctorno sensitive capability
Show 36 more tools ↓
geneno sensitive capabilityGene Detailno sensitive capabilityget_arena_rankingsno sensitive capabilityget_developer_profileno sensitive capabilityget_gene_detailno sensitive capabilityget_gene_reputationno sensitive capabilityget_leaderboardno sensitive capabilityget_mcp_statsno sensitive capabilityget_my_reputationno sensitive capabilityinit_geneno sensitive capabilityinputno sensitive capabilityinstall_geneno sensitive capabilitylist_gene_versionsno sensitive capabilitylist_local_agentsno sensitive capabilitylist_local_genesno sensitive capabilityLocal Agent Registryno sensitive capabilityLocal Gene Inventoryno sensitive capabilityloginno sensitive capabilitylogoutno sensitive capabilitypublish_geneno sensitive capabilityReputation Leaderboardno sensitive capabilityrollback_geneno sensitive capabilityrotifer-architectno sensitive capabilityrotifer-challengeno sensitive capabilityrotifer-guideno sensitive capabilityrotifer-hellono sensitive capabilityrun_geneno sensitive capabilityscan_genesno sensitive capabilitysearch_genesno sensitive capabilitysuggest_domainno sensitive capabilitytaskno sensitive capabilitytemplateno sensitive capabilitytest_geneno sensitive capabilityVersion Infono sensitive capabilityvg_scanno sensitive capabilitywrap_geneno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (46 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 9
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.19.0 latest |
A 94/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.18.0 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-06 |
v0.17.0 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-30 |
v0.16.1 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-21 |
v0.16.0 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-18 |
Show 4 more versions ↓
v0.15.0 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-16 |
v0.11.0 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-15 |
v0.10.0 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-14 |
v0.9.1 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-10 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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