Roku — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.8.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.8.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.8"
},
"target": {
"id": "roku-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "roku-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "roku-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.8"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can send data / act on an external service",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (38 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-004",
"title": "Sensitive-source and external-sink co-exist",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tools that read sensitive data ([analyze_bsprof, bsprof_info, analyze_perfetto, query_perfetto]) and tools that can send data out ([roku_console_send]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.",
"remediation": "Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "analyze_bsprof → roku_console_send"
},
"evidence": "sources [analyze_bsprof, bsprof_info, analyze_perfetto, query_perfetto] → sinks [roku_console_send]",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"sources": [
"analyze_bsprof",
"bsprof_info",
"analyze_perfetto",
"query_perfetto"
],
"sinks": [
"roku_console_send"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"roku_console_send\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"roku_console_send\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter \"command\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "roku_console_send"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/stream/live.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/stream/live.js:197`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/stream/live.js"
},
"evidence": "axios.post(`http://${params.host}:8060/launch/dev?${qs}`",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/stream/live.js",
"line": 197
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-006",
"title": "Unconstrained command parameter \"command\" on \"roku_console_send\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"roku_console_send\" takes a command-shaped parameter \"command\" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.",
"remediation": "Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "roku_console_send",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.command"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"param": "command"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"roku_console_send\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"roku_console_send\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "roku_console_send"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"filePath\" on \"analyze_bsprof\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"analyze_bsprof\" takes a path parameter \"filePath\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "analyze_bsprof",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.filePath"
},
"data": {
"param": "filePath"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"filePath\" on \"bsprof_info\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"bsprof_info\" takes a path parameter \"filePath\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "bsprof_info",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.filePath"
},
"data": {
"param": "filePath"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"filePath\" on \"analyze_perfetto\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"analyze_perfetto\" takes a path parameter \"filePath\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "analyze_perfetto",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.filePath"
},
"data": {
"param": "filePath"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"filePath\" on \"query_perfetto\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"query_perfetto\" takes a path parameter \"filePath\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "query_perfetto",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.filePath"
},
"data": {
"param": "filePath"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [],
"sensitiveSource": [
"analyze_bsprof",
"bsprof_info",
"analyze_perfetto",
"query_perfetto"
],
"externalSink": [
"roku_console_send"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"analyze_bsprof",
"roku_console_send"
],
"pathWired": false,
"description": "A sensitive-source → external-sink chain exists: analyze_bsprof → roku_console_send."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "analyze_bsprof",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"parameter \"filepath\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "compare_bsprof",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bsprof_info",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"parameter \"filepath\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "roku_console_connect",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "roku_console_read",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "roku_console_send",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"parameter \"command\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "roku_console_disconnect",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "roku_deploy",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "roku_delete_dev_channel",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "roku_discover",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "roku_keypress",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "roku_keypress_sequence",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "roku_launch",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "roku_query_device_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "roku_query_active_app",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "roku_query_app_ui",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "roku_query_sg_nodes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "roku_type_text",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "roku_query_media_player",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "roku_find_node",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "roku_get_focused_node",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "roku_sleep",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "roku_edit_node",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "roku_set_node_visible",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "roku_move_node",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "roku_focus_node",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "roku_remove_node",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "roku_create_node",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "roku_get_value",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "roku_observe_field",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "roku_perfetto_enable",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "roku_perfetto_start",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "roku_perfetto_stop",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "analyze_perfetto",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"parameter \"filepath\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "compare_perfetto",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "query_perfetto",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"sql_query\"",
"parameter \"filepath\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "roku_screenshot",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "roku_diagnose_stream",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "1ab20b418045ef654f9ccaeb25b5e9098b39467a24ec9e6fa191e1293d285345",
"stats": {
"tools": 38,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 2,
"medium": 2,
"low": 5,
"info": 0
}
}
}