Robloxstudio Mcp Remake MCP Server
robloxstudio-mcp-remake
npm
v1.1.4
Published by qqww2w2k — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 7 = 87. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 21
high Tool "run_tests" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "run_tests" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool run_tests
high Tool "map_dependencies" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "map_dependencies" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool map_dependencies
high Tool "find_variable_leaks" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "find_variable_leaks" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool find_variable_leaks
high Tool "insert_comments" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "insert_comments" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool insert_comments
high Tool "generate_script" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "generate_script" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool generate_script
high Tool "build_context" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "build_context" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool build_context
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ; import { exec } from "child_process"; import path3 from "path"; import { fileURLToPath as fileURLToPath3 } from "url";
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:3671`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const csrfRes = await fetch("https://auth.roblox.com/v2/logout", { method: "POST", headers: { "Cookie": `.
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:6401`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: en" : "xdg-open"; exec(`${startCmd} "" "${dashboardUrl}"`, (err) => { if (err) console.error("Fa
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
medium Unconstrained command parameter "script_path" on "run_tests"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "run_tests" takes a command-shaped parameter "script_path" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool run_tests · inputSchema.properties.script_path
medium Unconstrained command parameter "script_path" on "map_dependencies"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "map_dependencies" takes a command-shaped parameter "script_path" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool map_dependencies · inputSchema.properties.script_path
medium Unconstrained command parameter "script_path" on "find_variable_leaks"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "find_variable_leaks" takes a command-shaped parameter "script_path" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool find_variable_leaks · inputSchema.properties.script_path
medium Unconstrained command parameter "script_path" on "insert_comments"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "insert_comments" takes a command-shaped parameter "script_path" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool insert_comments · inputSchema.properties.script_path
medium Unconstrained command parameter "script_name" on "generate_script"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "generate_script" takes a command-shaped parameter "script_name" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool generate_script · inputSchema.properties.script_name
medium Unconstrained command parameter "script_path" on "build_context"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "build_context" takes a command-shaped parameter "script_path" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool build_context · inputSchema.properties.script_path
low Mutating tool "run_tests" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "run_tests" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool run_tests
low Mutating tool "map_dependencies" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "map_dependencies" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool map_dependencies
low Mutating tool "find_variable_leaks" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "find_variable_leaks" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool find_variable_leaks
low Mutating tool "insert_comments" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "insert_comments" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool insert_comments
low Mutating tool "generate_script" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "generate_script" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool generate_script
low Mutating tool "build_context" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "build_context" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool build_context
Tools 96
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
build_contextruns code / shellfind_variable_leaksruns code / shellgenerate_scriptruns code / shellinsert_commentsruns code / shellmap_dependenciesruns code / shellrun_testsruns code / shelladd_tagno sensitive capabilityanalyze_performanceno sensitive capabilityauto_placeno sensitive capabilitybatch_executeno sensitive capability
Show 86 more tools ↓
build_cutsceneno sensitive capabilitybuild_libraryno sensitive capabilitybuild_uino sensitive capabilitybulk_get_scriptsno sensitive capabilitybulk_set_propertiesno sensitive capabilitycapture_screenshotno sensitive capabilitycapture_uino sensitive capabilitycapture_viewportno sensitive capabilitycheck_collisionsno sensitive capabilitycheck_ui_designno sensitive capabilitycontrol_audio_animationno sensitive capabilitycontrol_lightingno sensitive capabilitycontrol_selectionno sensitive capabilitycreate_buildno sensitive capabilitycreate_objectno sensitive capabilitydelete_attributeno sensitive capabilitydelete_objectno sensitive capabilitydelete_script_linesno sensitive capabilitydiff_instancesno sensitive capabilityedit_script_linesno sensitive capabilityexecute_luauno sensitive capabilityexport_buildno sensitive capabilityfix_namingno sensitive capabilitygenerate_buildno sensitive capabilitygenerate_terrainno sensitive capabilitygenerate_test_reportno sensitive capabilityget_asset_detailsno sensitive capabilityget_asset_thumbnailno sensitive capabilityget_attributeno sensitive capabilityget_attributesno sensitive capabilityget_buildno sensitive capabilityget_class_infono sensitive capabilityget_file_treeno sensitive capabilityget_instance_childrenno sensitive capabilityget_instance_children_pathno sensitive capabilityget_instance_propertiesno sensitive capabilityget_place_infono sensitive capabilityget_playtest_outputno sensitive capabilityget_project_structureno sensitive capabilityget_script_sourceno sensitive capabilityget_selectionno sensitive capabilityget_servicesno sensitive capabilityget_taggedno sensitive capabilityget_tagsno sensitive capabilityget_tree_pathno sensitive capabilityget_ui_templatesno sensitive capabilitygrep_scriptsno sensitive capabilityhistory_controlno sensitive capabilityimport_buildno sensitive capabilityimport_sceneno sensitive capabilityinsert_assetno sensitive capabilityinsert_script_linesno sensitive capabilitylist_libraryno sensitive capabilitymanage_backupsno sensitive capabilitymanage_datastoreno sensitive capabilitymanage_placesno sensitive capabilitymass_create_objectsno sensitive capabilitymass_duplicateno sensitive capabilitymass_get_propertyno sensitive capabilitymass_set_propertyno sensitive capabilitymirror_instancesno sensitive capabilitymonitor_remotesno sensitive capabilitypaint_surfacesno sensitive capabilitypreview_assetno sensitive capabilityredono sensitive capabilityremove_tagno sensitive capabilityroblox_studio_workflowno sensitive capabilityscan_anticheatno sensitive capabilitysearch_assetsno sensitive capabilitysearch_by_propertyno sensitive capabilitysearch_filesno sensitive capabilitysearch_materialsno sensitive capabilitysearch_objectsno sensitive capabilityset_attributeno sensitive capabilityset_propertyno sensitive capabilityset_script_sourceno sensitive capabilitysimulate_physicsno sensitive capabilitysmart_duplicateno sensitive capabilitysnap_to_gridno sensitive capabilitystart_playtestno sensitive capabilitystop_playtestno sensitive capabilitysync_projectno sensitive capabilitysync_project_enhancedno sensitive capabilitytrack_changesno sensitive capabilityundono sensitive capabilityvalidate_pathfindingno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (96 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.1.4 latest |
B 87/100 | 21 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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