Roblox (DexCodeSX) MCP Server
roblox-mcp-server
npm
v3.8.4
Published by dexcodesx — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
An MCP server for interacting with Roblox Game Clients (Delta, etc) over WebSocket+HTTP, with a server side decompile pipeline and in game UI.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 7.5 = 93. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 93 − 7 = 86. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 7
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/index.js:385`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: } = await import("node:child_process"); const tries = process.platform === "darwin" ? [["pbcopy", []]]
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/platform/windows-screenshot.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/platform/windows-screenshot.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; import fs from "fs"; import os from "os"; import path from "path"; export functi
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/platform/windows-screenshot.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/http/routes/api/avatar.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/http/routes/api/avatar.js:9`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const robloxRes = await fetch(`https://thumbnails.roblox.com/v1/users/avatar-headshot?userIds=${encodeURIComponent(userI
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/http/routes/api/avatar.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/platform/windows-screenshot.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/platform/windows-screenshot.js:60`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: "); const raw = execSync(`powershell -NoProfile -NonInteractive -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File "${tmpFile}"`, { e
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/platform/windows-screenshot.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/tools/impl/hydroxide/spy-closure.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/impl/hydroxide/spy-closure.js:13`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: get function. Example: 'require(game.ReplicatedStorage.Combat).Validate' or 'game:GetService(\"Players\").LocalPlayer.Ch
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/impl/hydroxide/spy-closure.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/install-harnesses.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/install-harnesses.mjs:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import fs from "node:fs/promises"; import fsSync from "node:fs"; import os from
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/install-harnesses.mjs
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"roblox-mcp-server" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node scripts/postinstall.mjs
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package roblox-mcp-server
Tools 34
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
dump-visible-uireads sensitive datablock-remoteno sensitive capabilityclear-remote-spy-logsno sensitive capabilityclick-buttonno sensitive capabilityensure-hydroxideno sensitive capabilityensure-remote-spyno sensitive capabilityensure-scanXno sensitive capabilityexecuteno sensitive capabilityexecute-fileno sensitive capabilityget-console-outputno sensitive capability
Show 24 more tools ↓
get-data-by-codeno sensitive capabilityget-descendants-treeno sensitive capabilityget-game-infono sensitive capabilityget-remote-spy-logsno sensitive capabilityget-script-contentno sensitive capabilityhot-reloadno sensitive capabilityhydroxide-list-modulesno sensitive capabilityhydroxide-scan-constantsno sensitive capabilityhydroxide-scan-upvaluesno sensitive capabilityhydroxide-spy-closureno sensitive capabilityignore-remoteno sensitive capabilitylist-clientsno sensitive capabilitylist-roblox-windowsno sensitive capabilityscanX-callersno sensitive capabilityscanX-memoryno sensitive capabilityscanX-remotesno sensitive capabilityscanX-scriptsno sensitive capabilityscreenshot-windowno sensitive capabilityscript-grepno sensitive capabilitysearch-instancesno sensitive capabilitysemantic-search-scriptsno sensitive capabilityset-active-clientno sensitive capabilitysubscribe-remoteno sensitive capabilitytype-text-boxno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (34 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v3.8.4 latest |
B 86/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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