robinhood-mcp
npm
v0.1.1
Published by nirholas — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Model Context Protocol servers for the official Robinhood Crypto Trading API: a read-only server (quotes, holdings, orders, account) and an explicitly opt-in trading server with hard spend caps and a confirm gate. Ed25519 request signing verified against
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: algo_get_job → risk_limits_export ⇒ generate_client_code. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink — and at least one leg is a direct schema wire (⇒), where a producer's output drops straight into a free-text parameter of the next tool, so the chain needs little agent cooperation. Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow algo_get_job → risk_limits_export → generate_client_code
In the server's implementation (`dist/chunk-NNL7FPUQ.js:3974`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch("https://trading.robinhood.com/", { method: "HEAD", signal: AbortSignal.timeou
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/chunk-NNL7FPUQ.js
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
algo_get_jobingests untrusted inputgenerate_client_codenetwork egressget_accountingests untrusted inputget_orderingests untrusted inputget_volatilityingests untrusted inputrisk_limits_exportreads sensitive dataalgo_accumulate_startno sensitive capabilityalgo_bracket_startno sensitive capabilityalgo_cancel_jobno sensitive capabilityalgo_chase_startno sensitive capabilityalgo_dca_startno sensitive capabilityalgo_grid_startno sensitive capabilityalgo_iceberg_startno sensitive capabilityalgo_ladder_startno sensitive capabilityalgo_list_jobsno sensitive capabilityalgo_list_strategiesno sensitive capabilityalgo_mean_reversion_startno sensitive capabilityalgo_momentum_startno sensitive capabilityalgo_oco_startno sensitive capabilityalgo_rebalance_startno sensitive capabilityalgo_startno sensitive capabilityalgo_trailing_stop_startno sensitive capabilityalgo_twap_startno sensitive capabilityanalyze_trade_historyno sensitive capabilitycancel_orderno sensitive capabilitycheck_environmentno sensitive capabilitydiagnose_connectionno sensitive capabilityestimate_slippageno sensitive capabilityexplain_signatureno sensitive capabilitygenerate_keypairno sensitive capabilityget_allocationno sensitive capabilityget_best_bid_askno sensitive capabilityget_connection_infono sensitive capabilityget_cost_basisno sensitive capabilityget_estimated_priceno sensitive capabilityget_execution_policyno sensitive capabilityget_holdingsno sensitive capabilityget_ordersno sensitive capabilityget_realized_pnlno sensitive capabilityget_setup_statusno sensitive capabilityget_trading_pairsno sensitive capabilityjournal_daily_summaryno sensitive capabilityjournal_export_csvno sensitive capabilityjournal_fillsno sensitive capabilityjournal_open_ordersno sensitive capabilityjournal_performanceno sensitive capabilityjournal_reconcileno sensitive capabilityjournal_trade_historyno sensitive capabilitylist_modulesno sensitive capabilityops_api_versionno sensitive capabilityops_clock_skewno sensitive capabilityops_diagnosticsno sensitive capabilityops_healthno sensitive capabilityops_jobs_pending_intentsno sensitive capabilityops_key_checkno sensitive capabilityops_rate_limitno sensitive capabilityops_supervisor_statusno sensitive capabilityplace_orderno sensitive capabilityplace_stop_limitno sensitive capabilityplace_stop_lossno sensitive capabilityrisk_check_orderno sensitive capabilityrisk_concentrationno sensitive capabilityrisk_drawdownno sensitive capabilityrisk_exposureno sensitive capabilityrisk_kill_switch_engageno sensitive capabilityrisk_kill_switch_releaseno sensitive capabilityrisk_position_sizeno sensitive capabilityrisk_statusno sensitive capabilitysize_position_by_riskno sensitive capabilityverify_keypairno sensitive capabilityCross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-08 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan robinhood-mcp --online
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