Robinhood (nirholas) MCP Server

robinhood-mcp npm v0.1.1

Published by nirholas — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.

Model Context Protocol servers for the official Robinhood Crypto Trading API: a read-only server (quotes, holdings, orders, account) and an explicitly opt-in trading server with hard spend caps and a confirm gate. Ed25519 request signing verified against

Trust grade
A
93/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 93/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 93/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−6 capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−1 publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 2

critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002

This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: algo_get_job → risk_limits_export ⇒ generate_client_code. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink — and at least one leg is a direct schema wire (⇒), where a producer's output drops straight into a free-text parameter of the next tool, so the chain needs little agent cooperation. Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.

Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.

Location: flow algo_get_job → risk_limits_export → generate_client_code

medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/chunk-NNL7FPUQ.js)MTC-SRC-003

In the server's implementation (`dist/chunk-NNL7FPUQ.js:3974`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: const response = await fetch("https://trading.robinhood.com/", { method: "HEAD", signal: AbortSignal.timeou

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/chunk-NNL7FPUQ.js

Tools 70

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • algo_get_jobingests untrusted input
  • generate_client_codenetwork egress
  • get_accountingests untrusted input
  • get_orderingests untrusted input
  • get_volatilityingests untrusted input
  • risk_limits_exportreads sensitive data
  • algo_accumulate_startno sensitive capability
  • algo_bracket_startno sensitive capability
  • algo_cancel_jobno sensitive capability
  • algo_chase_startno sensitive capability
Show 60 more tools ↓
  • algo_dca_startno sensitive capability
  • algo_grid_startno sensitive capability
  • algo_iceberg_startno sensitive capability
  • algo_ladder_startno sensitive capability
  • algo_list_jobsno sensitive capability
  • algo_list_strategiesno sensitive capability
  • algo_mean_reversion_startno sensitive capability
  • algo_momentum_startno sensitive capability
  • algo_oco_startno sensitive capability
  • algo_rebalance_startno sensitive capability
  • algo_startno sensitive capability
  • algo_trailing_stop_startno sensitive capability
  • algo_twap_startno sensitive capability
  • analyze_trade_historyno sensitive capability
  • cancel_orderno sensitive capability
  • check_environmentno sensitive capability
  • diagnose_connectionno sensitive capability
  • estimate_slippageno sensitive capability
  • explain_signatureno sensitive capability
  • generate_keypairno sensitive capability
  • get_allocationno sensitive capability
  • get_best_bid_askno sensitive capability
  • get_connection_infono sensitive capability
  • get_cost_basisno sensitive capability
  • get_estimated_priceno sensitive capability
  • get_execution_policyno sensitive capability
  • get_holdingsno sensitive capability
  • get_ordersno sensitive capability
  • get_realized_pnlno sensitive capability
  • get_setup_statusno sensitive capability
  • get_trading_pairsno sensitive capability
  • journal_daily_summaryno sensitive capability
  • journal_export_csvno sensitive capability
  • journal_fillsno sensitive capability
  • journal_open_ordersno sensitive capability
  • journal_performanceno sensitive capability
  • journal_reconcileno sensitive capability
  • journal_trade_historyno sensitive capability
  • list_modulesno sensitive capability
  • ops_api_versionno sensitive capability
  • ops_clock_skewno sensitive capability
  • ops_diagnosticsno sensitive capability
  • ops_healthno sensitive capability
  • ops_jobs_pending_intentsno sensitive capability
  • ops_key_checkno sensitive capability
  • ops_rate_limitno sensitive capability
  • ops_supervisor_statusno sensitive capability
  • place_orderno sensitive capability
  • place_stop_limitno sensitive capability
  • place_stop_lossno sensitive capability
  • risk_check_orderno sensitive capability
  • risk_concentrationno sensitive capability
  • risk_drawdownno sensitive capability
  • risk_exposureno sensitive capability
  • risk_kill_switch_engageno sensitive capability
  • risk_kill_switch_releaseno sensitive capability
  • risk_position_sizeno sensitive capability
  • risk_statusno sensitive capability
  • size_position_by_riskno sensitive capability
  • verify_keypairno sensitive capability

Toxic flows 1

Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).

What this scan could not see

Versions 1

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v0.1.1 latest A 93/100 2 1.13.0 2026-09-08

Embed this score

Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: A · 93/100
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan robinhood-mcp --online

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Other implementations of Robinhood 2

Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 3 side by side →

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