Rise MCP Server
rise-mcp
npm
v1.17.0
Published by gzlo — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for RISE CRM — integra RISE CRM con Claude, Cursor, Copilot, Windsurf y otras IAs. Soporta STDIO (local), HTTP (Node.js) y Cloudflare Workers.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist-worker/jszip.min-QIQBB3F5.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist-worker/jszip.min-QIQBB3F5.js:2`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ypeof S!="function"&&(S=new Function(""+S));for(var x=new Array(arguments.length-1),D=0;D<x.length;D++)x[D]=arguments[D+
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist-worker/jszip.min-QIQBB3F5.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist-worker/worker.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist-worker/worker.js:5`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ode.process(d,t));let m=new Function(`${Tt.default.self}`,`${Tt.default.scope}`,d)(this,this.scope.get());if(this.scope.
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist-worker/worker.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/chunk-U74CMTI5.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/chunk-U74CMTI5.js:2970`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const makeValidate = new Function(`${names_1.default.self}`, `${names_1.default.scope}`, sourceCode); const v
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/chunk-U74CMTI5.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist-worker/pdfjs-JSFPDGC2.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist-worker/pdfjs-JSFPDGC2.js:53`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: oLowerCase()??i[2]:null}exec(e,i){let a=this.callbacks.get(i.key);if(!a){if(/^[a-z]$/i.test(i.key))return;let h=qs.#e(i.
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist-worker/pdfjs-JSFPDGC2.js
Tools 44
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
contractsingests untrusted inputestimatesingests untrusted inputfilesingests untrusted inputinvoicesingests untrusted inputmediaingests untrusted inputordersingests untrusted inputproposalsingests untrusted inputtasksingests untrusted inputannouncementsno sensitive capabilityapi_keysno sensitive capability
Show 34 more tools ↓
attendanceno sensitive capabilityauth_sessionno sensitive capabilityclientsno sensitive capabilitycontactsno sensitive capabilitycustom_field_valuesno sensitive capabilitycustom_fieldsno sensitive capabilityeventsno sensitive capabilityexpensesno sensitive capabilityfoldersno sensitive capabilityhealthno sensitive capabilityknowledge_baseno sensitive capabilitylabelsno sensitive capabilityleadsno sensitive capabilityleavesno sensitive capabilitymeno sensitive capabilitymessagesno sensitive capabilitymy_permissionsno sensitive capabilitynotesno sensitive capabilitynotification_settingsno sensitive capabilityprojectsno sensitive capabilityrefresh_sessionno sensitive capabilityremindersno sensitive capabilityreportsno sensitive capabilityrolesno sensitive capabilitysettingsno sensitive capabilitysubscriptionsno sensitive capabilitytaxonomiesno sensitive capabilityteamsno sensitive capabilitytemplatesno sensitive capabilityticketsno sensitive capabilitytimelineno sensitive capabilitytodono sensitive capabilityusersno sensitive capabilitywebhooksno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (44 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 3
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.17.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v1.13.0 |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-13 |
v1.4.0 |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-28 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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