Forgejo (ric_) MCP Server
@ric_/forgejo-mcp
npm
v0.1.7
Published by @ric_ — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
A Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Forgejo and Gitea instances. Provides 103 tools across repos, issues, PRs, orgs, users, and admin APIs. Works with Claude, Cursor, and any MCP-compatible client. Supports stdio and HTTP transports. Built with Clau
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([get_file_contents]) and tools that can send data out ([create_issue, create_issue_comment, create_pull_request]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [get_file_contents] → sinks [create_issue, create_issue_comment, create_pull_request]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow get_file_contents → create_issue
medium Tool "create_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "create_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "create_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool create_file
medium Tool "delete_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "delete_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "delete_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool delete_file
low Mutating tool "create_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "create_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool create_file
low Mutating tool "delete_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "delete_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool delete_file
Tools 103
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
create_filewrites filescreate_issuenetwork egresscreate_issue_commentnetwork egresscreate_pull_requestnetwork egressdelete_filewrites filesget_file_contentsreads sensitive dataadd_collaboratorno sensitive capabilityadd_issue_labelsno sensitive capabilityadd_team_memberno sensitive capabilityadmin_create_userno sensitive capability
Show 93 more tools ↓
admin_delete_userno sensitive capabilityadmin_edit_userno sensitive capabilityadmin_list_cron_jobsno sensitive capabilityadmin_list_hooksno sensitive capabilityadmin_list_usersno sensitive capabilityadmin_run_cron_jobno sensitive capabilitycreate_branchno sensitive capabilitycreate_labelno sensitive capabilitycreate_milestoneno sensitive capabilitycreate_orgno sensitive capabilitycreate_org_repono sensitive capabilitycreate_pr_reviewno sensitive capabilitycreate_releaseno sensitive capabilitycreate_repono sensitive capabilitycreate_teamno sensitive capabilitydelete_branchno sensitive capabilitydelete_issue_commentno sensitive capabilitydelete_labelno sensitive capabilitydelete_milestoneno sensitive capabilitydelete_orgno sensitive capabilitydelete_repono sensitive capabilityedit_issueno sensitive capabilityedit_issue_commentno sensitive capabilityedit_labelno sensitive capabilityedit_milestoneno sensitive capabilityedit_orgno sensitive capabilityedit_pull_requestno sensitive capabilityedit_repono sensitive capabilityfork_repono sensitive capabilityget_authenticated_userno sensitive capabilityget_branchno sensitive capabilityget_gitignore_templateno sensitive capabilityget_issueno sensitive capabilityget_labelno sensitive capabilityget_label_templateno sensitive capabilityget_license_templateno sensitive capabilityget_milestoneno sensitive capabilityget_nodeinfono sensitive capabilityget_orgno sensitive capabilityget_pr_diffno sensitive capabilityget_pull_requestno sensitive capabilityget_repono sensitive capabilityget_runner_registration_tokenno sensitive capabilityget_server_versionno sensitive capabilityget_teamno sensitive capabilityget_userno sensitive capabilitylist_action_runners_jobsno sensitive capabilitylist_branchesno sensitive capabilitylist_collaboratorsno sensitive capabilitylist_followersno sensitive capabilitylist_followingno sensitive capabilitylist_forksno sensitive capabilitylist_gitignore_templatesno sensitive capabilitylist_issue_commentsno sensitive capabilitylist_issuesno sensitive capabilitylist_label_templatesno sensitive capabilitylist_labelsno sensitive capabilitylist_license_templatesno sensitive capabilitylist_milestonesno sensitive capabilitylist_my_notificationsno sensitive capabilitylist_my_starredno sensitive capabilitylist_org_hooksno sensitive capabilitylist_org_labelsno sensitive capabilitylist_org_membersno sensitive capabilitylist_org_reposno sensitive capabilitylist_org_teamsno sensitive capabilitylist_orgsno sensitive capabilitylist_pr_commitsno sensitive capabilitylist_pr_filesno sensitive capabilitylist_pr_reviewsno sensitive capabilitylist_pull_requestsno sensitive capabilitylist_releasesno sensitive capabilitylist_repo_commitsno sensitive capabilitylist_repo_topicsno sensitive capabilitylist_tagsno sensitive capabilitylist_user_orgsno sensitive capabilitylist_user_reposno sensitive capabilitylist_user_starredno sensitive capabilitymark_notifications_readno sensitive capabilitymerge_pull_requestno sensitive capabilityremove_issue_labelno sensitive capabilityremove_team_memberno sensitive capabilityrender_markdownno sensitive capabilityrender_markupno sensitive capabilityrequest_pr_reviewno sensitive capabilitysearch_reposno sensitive capabilitysearch_usersno sensitive capabilitystar_repono sensitive capabilitytransfer_repono sensitive capabilityunstar_repono sensitive capabilityupdate_fileno sensitive capabilityupdate_pr_branchno sensitive capabilityupdate_repo_topicsno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (103 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.7 latest |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @ric_/forgejo-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Forgejo 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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