Revit (vespo92) MCP Server
revit-mcp
npm
v2.3.0
Published by vespo92 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Enhanced Revit MCP server with AutoCAD, PDF, and Excel integration. Includes elevator automation, floor duplication, intelligent element search, and cross-platform data exchange. Secure implementation with authentication and rate limiting.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (build/tools/register.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`build/tools/register.js:26`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const module = await import(importPath); // Find and execute the registration function const
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/tools/register.js
Tools 25
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
export_to_dxfnetwork egressgenerate_quantity_takeoffnetwork egressai_element_filterno sensitive capabilitycolor_elementsno sensitive capabilitycoordinate_with_autocadno sensitive capabilitycreate_line_based_elementno sensitive capabilitycreate_point_based_elementno sensitive capabilitycreate_surface_based_elementno sensitive capabilitydelete_elementno sensitive capabilityduplicate_floor_elementsno sensitive capability
Show 15 more tools ↓
elevator_automationno sensitive capabilityexport_schedule_to_excelno sensitive capabilityextract_pdf_textno sensitive capabilitygenerate_pdf_from_viewno sensitive capabilityget_available_family_typesno sensitive capabilityget_current_view_elementsno sensitive capabilityget_current_view_infono sensitive capabilityget_selected_elementsno sensitive capabilityimport_dxfno sensitive capabilityimport_parameters_from_excelno sensitive capabilitymodify_elementno sensitive capabilityoperate_elementno sensitive capabilityparse_dxf_metadatano sensitive capabilitysend_code_to_revit_secureno sensitive capabilitytag_all_wallsno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (25 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.3.0 latest |
A 96/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan revit-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Revit 4
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 5 side by side →
MCP Server for Revit integration - AI-Powered Revit Control
MCP server for interacting with Autodesk Revit through AI assistants like Claude
revit integration through the Model Context Protocol
MCP Server for Autodesk Revit — 179 AI-powered tools for BIM automation. Works with Claude Desktop, Cursor, Windsurf, and any MCP client. Supports Revit 2020–2026.
More in Design & Media
Turn designs into shipped parts: quote 3D printing, CNC, and decals, then check out.
Aleph's official SiliconFlow media-generation MCP server (image / video / TTS)
MCP server for image generation using Google Gemini AI
Ambience AI MCP Server - Generate images, videos, and audio through Model Context Protocol
MCP server exposing every endpoint of the AstroWay Calculation API as tools — natal, synastry, transits, Vedic dashas, Tarot, Numerology, Human Design, AI horoscopes — for Claude Desktop, Cursor and any MCP-compatible AI agent.
Audio-guide and trip-planning tools for 1,100+ cities from Audiala. Free, no API key.