Reveldigital MCP Server

@reveldigital/reveldigital-mcp-server npm v1.0.20

Published by @reveldigital — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.

MCP Server generated from OpenAPI spec for revel-digital-rest-api

Trust grade
A
93/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 93/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
Share this Trust Score
𝕏 Share LinkedIn Reddit
A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 93/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−6 capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−1 publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 4

high Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (build/index.js)MTC-SRC-010

In the server's implementation (`build/index.js:1227`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: const zodSchema = eval(zodSchemaString); if (typeof zodSchema?.parse !== 'function') { throw n

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server build/index.js

high Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (src/index.ts)MTC-SRC-010

In the server's implementation (`src/index.ts:1338`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: const zodSchema = eval(zodSchemaString); if (typeof zodSchema?.parse !== 'function') { thro

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server src/index.ts

high Dynamic code execution in server code (build/index.js)MTC-SRC-001

In the server's implementation (`build/index.js:1227`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: const zodSchema = eval(zodSchemaString); if (typeof zodSchema?.parse !== 'function') { throw n

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server build/index.js

high Dynamic code execution in server code (src/index.ts)MTC-SRC-001

In the server's implementation (`src/index.ts:1338`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: const zodSchema = eval(zodSchemaString); if (typeof zodSchema?.parse !== 'function') { thro

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server src/index.ts

Tools 64

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • deletedeviceno sensitive capability
  • deletedevicegroupno sensitive capability
  • deletemediano sensitive capability
  • deletemediagroupno sensitive capability
  • deleteplaylistno sensitive capability
  • deleteplaylistgroupno sensitive capability
  • deletescheduleno sensitive capability
  • deleteschedulegroupno sensitive capability
  • deletetemplateno sensitive capability
  • deletetemplategroupno sensitive capability
Show 54 more tools ↓
  • getaccountno sensitive capability
  • getdevicebyidno sensitive capability
  • getdevicegroupsno sensitive capability
  • getdevicepingdatano sensitive capability
  • getdevicesno sensitive capability
  • getmediano sensitive capability
  • getmediabyidno sensitive capability
  • getmediagroupsno sensitive capability
  • getorganizationsno sensitive capability
  • getpingdatano sensitive capability
  • getplaylistbyidno sensitive capability
  • getplaylistgroupsno sensitive capability
  • getplaylistsno sensitive capability
  • getreportbyidno sensitive capability
  • getschedulebyidno sensitive capability
  • getschedulegroupsno sensitive capability
  • getschedulesno sensitive capability
  • getsnapshotno sensitive capability
  • gettemplatebyidno sensitive capability
  • gettemplategroupsno sensitive capability
  • gettemplatesno sensitive capability
  • getuserbyidno sensitive capability
  • getusersno sensitive capability
  • patchdeviceno sensitive capability
  • patchmediano sensitive capability
  • patchplaylistno sensitive capability
  • patchscheduleno sensitive capability
  • postdeviceno sensitive capability
  • postdevicecommandsno sensitive capability
  • postdevicegroupno sensitive capability
  • postdevicescommandsno sensitive capability
  • posteventno sensitive capability
  • postmediabyfilenameno sensitive capability
  • postmediagroupno sensitive capability
  • postmediaimportno sensitive capability
  • postmediamultipartno sensitive capability
  • postplaylistno sensitive capability
  • postplaylistgroupno sensitive capability
  • postreportadhawkno sensitive capability
  • postreportexportno sensitive capability
  • postscheduleno sensitive capability
  • postschedulegroupno sensitive capability
  • posttemplategroupno sensitive capability
  • putaccountno sensitive capability
  • putdeviceno sensitive capability
  • putdevicegroupno sensitive capability
  • putmediano sensitive capability
  • putmediagroupno sensitive capability
  • putplaylistno sensitive capability
  • putplaylistgroupno sensitive capability
  • putscheduleno sensitive capability
  • putschedulegroupno sensitive capability
  • puttemplategroupno sensitive capability
  • revel-digital-assistantno sensitive capability

What this scan could not see

Versions 1

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v1.0.20 latest A 93/100 4 1.13.0 2026-09-09

Embed this score

Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: A · 93/100
Markdown (GitHub README)
[![MCP Trust Score](https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/reveldigital-reveldigital-mcp-server/badge.svg)](https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/reveldigital-reveldigital-mcp-server)
HTML
<a href="https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/reveldigital-reveldigital-mcp-server"><img src="https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/reveldigital-reveldigital-mcp-server/badge.svg" alt="MCP Trust Score" height="20"></a>
Prefer shields.io styling? Point it at https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/reveldigital-reveldigital-mcp-server/badge.json via https://img.shields.io/endpoint?url=…

Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan @reveldigital/reveldigital-mcp-server --online

Use the free API → How scoring works

More in Developer Tools