Resume Resume MCP Server
resume-resume
PyPI
v0.5.5
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 7
high Shell/command execution in server code (resume_resume/cli.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`resume_resume/cli.py:75`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ipboard(text: str): subprocess.run(["pbcopy"], input=text.encode(), check=True) def _open_iterm_tabs(commands: lis
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server resume_resume/cli.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (resume_resume/l2_tools.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`resume_resume/l2_tools.py:165`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: git_status = subprocess.run( ["git", "status", "--porcelain"], cwd=pr
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server resume_resume/l2_tools.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (resume_resume/mcp_server.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`resume_resume/mcp_server.py:786`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: e call status = subprocess.run( ["git", "status", "--porcelain", "-b"], capture_output=T
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server resume_resume/mcp_server.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (resume_resume/progress.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`resume_resume/progress.py:98`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: cess). try: subprocess.Popen( [sys.executable, "-m", "resume_resume.hud", "--listen", SOCKET_PAT
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server resume_resume/progress.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (resume_resume/self_tools.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`resume_resume/self_tools.py:420`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ) log = subprocess.run( ["git", "log", f"--since={since}", "--oneline", "--format=%h
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server resume_resume/self_tools.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (resume_resume/summarize.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`resume_resume/summarize.py:122`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: , "1"] result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server resume_resume/summarize.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (resume_resume/ui_v2.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`resume_resume/ui_v2.py:1201`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: subprocess.run(["code", project_dir], capture_output=True, timeout=5) _t.sleep(1.5)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server resume_resume/ui_v2.py
Tools 38
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
_stubno sensitive capabilityboot_upno sensitive capabilitydirty_reposno sensitive capabilityhealthy_sessionsno sensitive capabilitylist_projectsno sensitive capabilitymerge_contextno sensitive capabilitymy_weekno sensitive capabilityproject_orientno sensitive capabilityproject_summaryno sensitive capabilityread_sessionno sensitive capability
Show 28 more tools ↓
recent_sessionsno sensitive capabilityresume_in_terminalno sensitive capabilitysearch_sessionsno sensitive capabilityself_a1_auto_appliedno sensitive capabilityself_a1_fileno sensitive capabilityself_a1_outputno sensitive capabilityself_a1_promptno sensitive capabilityself_a2_fileno sensitive capabilityself_a2_scorecardno sensitive capabilityself_bundlesno sensitive capabilityself_errorsno sensitive capabilityself_insightsno sensitive capabilityself_load_thresholdsno sensitive capabilityself_process_decideno sensitive capabilityself_process_proposalsno sensitive capabilityself_proposal_historyno sensitive capabilityself_recent_callsno sensitive capabilityself_searchno sensitive capabilityself_slow_callsno sensitive capabilitysession_data_scienceno sensitive capabilitysession_insightsno sensitive capabilitysession_reportno sensitive capabilitysession_summaryno sensitive capabilitysession_threadno sensitive capabilitysession_timelineno sensitive capabilitysession_xrayno sensitive capabilitysuggest_nextno sensitive capabilitywhat_changedno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (38 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.5.5 latest |
A 92/100 | 7 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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