Restforgejs MCP Server

@restforgejs/mcp-server npm v1.3.0

Published by @restforgejs — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.

Trust grade
B
89/100
Last scanned
Trust
B · 89/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
Moderate
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
B Why this grade threat 93 − adoption risk = 89/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 6.7 = 93. What the published surface and source actually contain:

PointsWhat was foundCategory
−6.7 Possible combosquat of mcp ×4 MTC-SUP-006 supply-chain

2. Client adoption risk — 93 − 4 = 89. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−3 capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−1 publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable
inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 18

medium Tool "codegen_create_processor" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002

Tool "codegen_create_processor" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "overwrite"). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.

Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.

Location: tool codegen_create_processor

medium Tool "data_push" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002

Tool "data_push" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "overwrite"). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.

Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.

Location: tool data_push

medium Tool "designer_auth_create" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002

Tool "designer_auth_create" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "overwrite"). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.

Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.

Location: tool designer_auth_create

medium Tool "key_generate" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002

Tool "key_generate" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "overwrite"). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.

Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.

Location: tool key_generate

medium Tool "runtime_check_launcher_exists" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002

Tool "runtime_check_launcher_exists" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "overwrite"). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.

Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.

Location: tool runtime_check_launcher_exists

medium Tool "runtime_generate_launcher" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002

Tool "runtime_generate_launcher" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "overwrite"). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.

Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.

Location: tool runtime_generate_launcher

medium Tool "setup_write_env" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002

Tool "setup_write_env" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "overwrite"). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.

Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.

Location: tool setup_write_env

medium Possible combosquat of mcpMTC-SUP-006

"@restforgejs/mcp-server" is "mcp" with a decorative suffix — a common combosquat pattern.

Fix: Confirm you meant "mcp". Install packages only from their documented, official name.

Location: package @restforgejs/mcp-server

medium Possible combosquat of @playwright/mcpMTC-SUP-006

"@restforgejs/mcp-server" is "@playwright/mcp" with a decorative suffix — a common combosquat pattern.

Fix: Confirm you meant "@playwright/mcp". Install packages only from their documented, official name.

Location: package @restforgejs/mcp-server

medium Possible combosquat of @stripe/mcpMTC-SUP-006

"@restforgejs/mcp-server" is "@stripe/mcp" with a decorative suffix — a common combosquat pattern.

Fix: Confirm you meant "@stripe/mcp". Install packages only from their documented, official name.

Location: package @restforgejs/mcp-server

medium Possible combosquat of @browsermcp/mcpMTC-SUP-006

"@restforgejs/mcp-server" is "@browsermcp/mcp" with a decorative suffix — a common combosquat pattern.

Fix: Confirm you meant "@browsermcp/mcp". Install packages only from their documented, official name.

Location: package @restforgejs/mcp-server

low Mutating tool "codegen_create_processor" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "codegen_create_processor" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool codegen_create_processor

low Mutating tool "data_push" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "data_push" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool data_push

low Mutating tool "designer_auth_create" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "designer_auth_create" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool designer_auth_create

low Mutating tool "key_generate" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "key_generate" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool key_generate

low Mutating tool "runtime_check_launcher_exists" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "runtime_check_launcher_exists" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool runtime_check_launcher_exists

low Mutating tool "runtime_generate_launcher" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "runtime_generate_launcher" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool runtime_generate_launcher

low Mutating tool "setup_write_env" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005

Tool "setup_write_env" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool setup_write_env

Tools 65

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • codegen_create_processorwrites files
  • data_pullreads sensitive data
  • data_pushwrites files
  • designer_auth_createwrites files
  • health_pingreads sensitive data
  • key_generatewrites files
  • runtime_check_launcher_existswrites files
  • runtime_detect_configreads sensitive data
  • runtime_generate_launcherwrites files
  • runtime_validate_preflightreads sensitive data
  • setup_get_config_schemareads sensitive data
  • setup_get_init_templatereads sensitive data
  • setup_list_configsreads sensitive data
  • setup_read_envreads sensitive data
  • setup_validate_configreads sensitive data
  • setup_write_envwrites files
  • codegen_create_dashboardno sensitive capability
  • codegen_create_endpointno sensitive capability
  • codegen_create_kafka_consumerno sensitive capability
  • codegen_dbschema_applyno sensitive capability
  • codegen_dbschema_diffno sensitive capability
  • codegen_dbschema_generate_ddlno sensitive capability
  • codegen_dbschema_initno sensitive capability
  • codegen_dbschema_introspectno sensitive capability
  • codegen_dbschema_migrateno sensitive capability
  • codegen_dbschema_modelsno sensitive capability
  • codegen_dbschema_templateno sensitive capability
  • codegen_dbschema_validateno sensitive capability
  • codegen_describe_tableno sensitive capability
  • codegen_diff_payloadno sensitive capability
  • codegen_generate_payloadno sensitive capability
  • codegen_generate_testno sensitive capability
  • codegen_get_dashboard_catalogno sensitive capability
  • codegen_get_dbschema_catalogno sensitive capability
  • codegen_get_field_validation_catalogno sensitive capability
  • codegen_get_query_declarative_catalogno sensitive capability
  • codegen_list_tablesno sensitive capability
  • codegen_migrate_payloadno sensitive capability
  • codegen_sync_payloadno sensitive capability
  • codegen_validate_dashboard_payloadno sensitive capability
  • codegen_validate_payloadno sensitive capability
  • codegen_validate_sqlno sensitive capability
  • designer_auth_removeno sensitive capability
  • designer_generateno sensitive capability
  • designer_get_udf_catalogno sensitive capability
  • designer_init_projectno sensitive capability
  • designer_inspect_pluginno sensitive capability
  • designer_list_pluginsno sensitive capability
  • designer_preview_filesno sensitive capability
  • designer_scaffold_pluginno sensitive capability
  • designer_validate_payloadno sensitive capability
  • key_listno sensitive capability
  • key_revokeno sensitive capability
  • project_authno sensitive capability
  • project_deleteno sensitive capability
  • project_listno sensitive capability
  • runtime_check_statusno sensitive capability
  • runtime_detect_projectno sensitive capability
  • setup_clear_default_configno sensitive capability
  • setup_create_folderno sensitive capability
  • setup_get_default_configno sensitive capability
  • setup_init_configno sensitive capability
  • setup_install_packageno sensitive capability
  • setup_set_default_configno sensitive capability
  • setup_update_envno sensitive capability

What this scan could not see

Versions

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v1.3.0 latest B 89/100 18 1.8.0 2026-07-23

Embed this score

Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: B · 89/100
Markdown (GitHub README)
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan @restforgejs/mcp-server --online

Use the free API → How scoring works

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