Replicate (sena-labs) MCP Server
replicate-mcp-server
npm
v3.2.3
Published by sena-labs — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Universal MCP server giving any MCP client (Claude Desktop, claude.ai, Cursor, Cline, custom apps) native access to Replicate's full catalog: image, video, audio, music, speech, LLM, vision, upscale, inpaint, segment, transcription, embeddings, voice clon
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([replicate_run_deployment, replicate_generate_image, replicate_generate_video, replicate_chat, replicate_upscale_image, replicate_remove_background, replicate_run_model, replicate_get_prediction, replicate_generate_3d, replicate_lipsync, replicate_pipeline_start, replicate_batch_start]) co-exist with external-action tools ([replicate_upload_file, replicate_generate_3d, replicate_lipsync]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [replicate_run_deployment, replicate_generate_image, replicate_generate_video, replicate_chat, replicate_upscale_image, replicate_remove_background, r
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow replicate_run_deployment → replicate_upload_file
Tools 36
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
replicate_generate_3dingests untrusted inputnetwork egressreplicate_lipsyncingests untrusted inputnetwork egressreplicate_batch_startingests untrusted inputreplicate_chatingests untrusted inputreplicate_generate_imageingests untrusted inputreplicate_generate_videoingests untrusted inputreplicate_get_predictioningests untrusted inputreplicate_pipeline_startingests untrusted inputreplicate_remove_backgroundingests untrusted inputreplicate_run_deploymentingests untrusted input
Show 26 more tools ↓
replicate_run_modelingests untrusted inputreplicate_upload_filenetwork egressreplicate_upscale_imageingests untrusted inputreplicate_batch_statusno sensitive capabilityreplicate_cancel_predictionno sensitive capabilityreplicate_cancel_trainingno sensitive capabilityreplicate_clone_voiceno sensitive capabilityreplicate_create_trainingno sensitive capabilityreplicate_embed_textno sensitive capabilityreplicate_estimate_costno sensitive capabilityreplicate_generate_audiono sensitive capabilityreplicate_generate_speechno sensitive capabilityreplicate_get_deploymentno sensitive capabilityreplicate_get_model_schemano sensitive capabilityreplicate_get_trainingno sensitive capabilityreplicate_inpaintno sensitive capabilityreplicate_list_deploymentsno sensitive capabilityreplicate_list_predictionsno sensitive capabilityreplicate_list_trainingsno sensitive capabilityreplicate_pipeline_statusno sensitive capabilityreplicate_recommend_modelno sensitive capabilityreplicate_refresh_modelsno sensitive capabilityreplicate_search_modelsno sensitive capabilityreplicate_segmentno sensitive capabilityreplicate_transcribe_audiono sensitive capabilityreplicate_visionno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (36 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v3.2.3 latest |
A 96/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-08 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan replicate-mcp-server --onlineOther implementations of Replicate 3
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 4 side by side →
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