Renef MCP Server
renef-mcp
PyPI
v0.3.0
Published by ahmeth4n — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 9
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([renef_memory_dump]) and tools that can send data out ([renef_exec, renef_spawn, renef_zero_copy_multiline_exec]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [renef_memory_dump] → sinks [renef_exec, renef_spawn, renef_zero_copy_multiline_exec]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow renef_memory_dump → renef_exec
high Tool "renef_exec" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "renef_exec" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool renef_exec
high Tool "renef_spawn" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "renef_spawn" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "spawn" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool renef_spawn
high Tool "renef_zero_copy_multiline_exec" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "renef_zero_copy_multiline_exec" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool renef_zero_copy_multiline_exec
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/tools/core/renef_hard_reset.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/tools/core/renef_hard_reset.py:12`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ang""" try: subprocess.run(["pkill", "-9", "adb"], capture_output=True, timeout=5) except: pass
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/tools/core/renef_hard_reset.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/tools/core/renef_spawn.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/tools/core/renef_spawn.py:11`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: kage name of the app to spawn (e.g., com.example.app) hook_type: Hooking mechanism - 'pltgot' for PLT/GOT hookin
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/tools/core/renef_spawn.py
low Mutating tool "renef_exec" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "renef_exec" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool renef_exec
low Mutating tool "renef_spawn" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "renef_spawn" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool renef_spawn
low Mutating tool "renef_zero_copy_multiline_exec" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "renef_zero_copy_multiline_exec" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool renef_zero_copy_multiline_exec
Tools 75
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
renef_execruns code / shellrenef_memory_dumpreads sensitive datarenef_spawnruns code / shellrenef_zero_copy_multiline_execruns code / shelladb_current_appno sensitive capabilityadb_devicesno sensitive capabilityadb_list_appsno sensitive capabilityadb_root_statusno sensitive capabilityadb_selinux_disableno sensitive capabilityadb_selinux_enableno sensitive capability
Show 65 more tools ↓
adb_selinux_statusno sensitive capabilityadb_start_app_amno sensitive capabilityadb_start_app_monkeyno sensitive capabilityadb_stop_app_amno sensitive capabilityrenef_attachno sensitive capabilityrenef_cli_resetno sensitive capabilityrenef_console_logno sensitive capabilityrenef_detect_frameworkno sensitive capabilityrenef_file_existsno sensitive capabilityrenef_file_fdpathno sensitive capabilityrenef_file_readno sensitive capabilityrenef_file_readlinkno sensitive capabilityrenef_hard_resetno sensitive capabilityrenef_hook_generateno sensitive capabilityrenef_hook_javano sensitive capabilityrenef_hook_nativeno sensitive capabilityrenef_hooks_listno sensitive capabilityrenef_jni_delete_refno sensitive capabilityrenef_jni_get_stringno sensitive capabilityrenef_jni_new_stringno sensitive capabilityrenef_jni_string_lengthno sensitive capabilityrenef_jni_type_booleanno sensitive capabilityrenef_jni_type_intno sensitive capabilityrenef_jni_type_longno sensitive capabilityrenef_jni_type_stringno sensitive capabilityrenef_list_appsno sensitive capabilityrenef_load_scriptno sensitive capabilityrenef_mem_readno sensitive capabilityrenef_mem_read_stringno sensitive capabilityrenef_mem_read_u16no sensitive capabilityrenef_mem_read_u32no sensitive capabilityrenef_mem_read_u64no sensitive capabilityrenef_mem_read_u8no sensitive capabilityrenef_mem_searchno sensitive capabilityrenef_mem_search_jsonno sensitive capabilityrenef_mem_writeno sensitive capabilityrenef_mem_write_u16no sensitive capabilityrenef_mem_write_u32no sensitive capabilityrenef_mem_write_u64no sensitive capabilityrenef_mem_write_u8no sensitive capabilityrenef_memory_patchno sensitive capabilityrenef_module_exportsno sensitive capabilityrenef_module_findno sensitive capabilityrenef_module_listno sensitive capabilityrenef_module_symbolsno sensitive capabilityrenef_pingno sensitive capabilityrenef_pluginsno sensitive capabilityrenef_port_forward_addno sensitive capabilityrenef_port_forward_removeno sensitive capabilityrenef_port_forward_remove_allno sensitive capabilityrenef_port_forward_statusno sensitive capabilityrenef_sectionsno sensitive capabilityrenef_server_deployno sensitive capabilityrenef_server_killno sensitive capabilityrenef_server_logsno sensitive capabilityrenef_server_restartno sensitive capabilityrenef_server_startno sensitive capabilityrenef_server_statusno sensitive capabilityrenef_thread_backtraceno sensitive capabilityrenef_thread_idno sensitive capabilityrenef_unhookno sensitive capabilityrenef_watchno sensitive capabilityrenef_watch_realtimeno sensitive capabilityrunno sensitive capabilitysearch_techniquesno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (75 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.3.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 9 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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