Remotebrowser MCP Server
remotebrowser
PyPI
v0.1.1
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
Free your data
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Shell/command execution in server code (getgather/browsers_api_router.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`getgather/browsers_api_router.py:30`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: extend(args) return subprocess.run( cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, check=True, encoding="utf-8", error
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server getgather/browsers_api_router.py
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (getgather/mcp/blinds.py)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`getgather/mcp/blinds.py:36`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const res = await fetch('https://www.blinds.com/api/myaccount/orders/orderdetails/{id}', {{ method
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server getgather/mcp/blinds.py
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (getgather/mcp/youtube.py)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`getgather/mcp/youtube.py:251`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: " return fetch('https://www.youtube.com/youtubei/v1/browse?prettyPrint=false', {" "
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server getgather/mcp/youtube.py
Tools 41
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
calculate_calories_burnedno sensitive capabilitycalculate_tssno sensitive capabilitycheck_signinno sensitive capabilitycreate_calendar_eventno sensitive capabilityfinalize_signinno sensitive capabilityget_activitiesno sensitive capabilityget_activity_statsno sensitive capabilityget_book_detailsno sensitive capabilityget_browser_ip_addressno sensitive capabilityget_browsing_historyno sensitive capability
Show 31 more tools ↓
get_cartno sensitive capabilityget_cartsno sensitive capabilityget_channel_subscriptionsno sensitive capabilityget_favoritesno sensitive capabilityget_liked_videosno sensitive capabilityget_order_doneno sensitive capabilityget_order_historyno sensitive capabilityget_order_history_detailsno sensitive capabilityget_ordersno sensitive capabilityget_orders_with_paginationno sensitive capabilityget_prime_libraryno sensitive capabilityget_product_detailsno sensitive capabilityget_purchase_historyno sensitive capabilityget_purchase_history_with_detailsno sensitive capabilityget_purchasesno sensitive capabilityget_recent_activityno sensitive capabilityget_shop_detailsno sensitive capabilityget_upcoming_flightsno sensitive capabilityget_user_infono sensitive capabilityget_watch_historyno sensitive capabilityget_watch_laterno sensitive capabilityget_watchlistno sensitive capabilityget_wishlistno sensitive capabilityget_wishlist_detailsno sensitive capabilityget_wishlistsno sensitive capabilityget_zen_browser_ip_addressno sensitive capabilityremote_action_product_in_cartno sensitive capabilitysearch_productno sensitive capabilitysearch_purchase_historyno sensitive capabilitysearch_shopno sensitive capabilitysigninno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (41 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.1 latest |
A 92/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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