Remote Terminal (TiM00R) MCP Server
remote-terminal-mcp
PyPI
v1.3.3.post1
Published by tim00r — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Full SSH terminal for Linux servers with AI/user control and dual-stream visibility
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 32
high Tool "get_batch_script" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "get_batch_script" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool get_batch_script
high Tool "execute_script_content_by_id" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "execute_script_content_by_id" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool execute_script_content_by_id
high Tool "delete_batch_script" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "delete_batch_script" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool delete_batch_script
high Tool "build_script_from_commands" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "build_script_from_commands" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool build_script_from_commands
high Tool "execute_command" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "execute_command" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "execute command" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool execute_command
high Tool "check_command_status" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "check_command_status" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool check_command_status
high Tool "get_command_output" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "get_command_output" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool get_command_output
high Tool "cancel_command" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "cancel_command" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool cancel_command
high Tool "update_command_status" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "update_command_status" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool update_command_status
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([download_file, download_directory]) co-exist with external-action tools ([get_batch_script, execute_script_content_by_id, delete_batch_script, build_script_from_commands, execute_command, check_command_status, get_command_output, cancel_command, update_command_status, upload_file]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [download_file, download_directory] → sinks [get_batch_script, execute_script_content_by_id, delete_batch_script, build_script_from_commands, execute_
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow download_file → get_batch_script
medium Unconstrained command parameter "script_id" on "get_batch_script"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "get_batch_script" takes a command-shaped parameter "script_id" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool get_batch_script · inputSchema.properties.script_id
medium Unconstrained command parameter "script_id" on "execute_script_content_by_id"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "execute_script_content_by_id" takes a command-shaped parameter "script_id" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool execute_script_content_by_id · inputSchema.properties.script_id
medium Unconstrained command parameter "script_id" on "delete_batch_script"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "delete_batch_script" takes a command-shaped parameter "script_id" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool delete_batch_script · inputSchema.properties.script_id
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "build_script_from_commands"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "build_script_from_commands" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool build_script_from_commands · inputSchema.properties.command
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command_id" on "check_command_status"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "check_command_status" takes a command-shaped parameter "command_id" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool check_command_status · inputSchema.properties.command_id
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command_id" on "get_command_output"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "get_command_output" takes a command-shaped parameter "command_id" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool get_command_output · inputSchema.properties.command_id
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command_id" on "cancel_command"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "cancel_command" takes a command-shaped parameter "command_id" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool cancel_command · inputSchema.properties.command_id
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command_id" on "update_command_status"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "update_command_status" takes a command-shaped parameter "command_id" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool update_command_status · inputSchema.properties.command_id
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/output/output_buffer.py)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`src/output/output_buffer.py:11`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: .output_buffer_filtered import ( FilteredBuffer ) # Re-export all classes for backward compatibility __all__ =
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/output/output_buffer.py
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/tools/tools_sftp_directory.py)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`src/tools/tools_sftp_directory.py:16`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: s_sftp_directory_upload import ( sftp_upload_directory ) from .tools_sftp_directory_download import ( sftp_downl
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/tools/tools_sftp_directory.py
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/tools/tools_sftp_directory_download.py)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`src/tools/tools_sftp_directory_download.py:41`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ftp_transfer_compressed import ( execute_compressed_download ) logger = logging.getLogger(__name__) async def sft
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/tools/tools_sftp_directory_download.py
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/tools/tools_sftp_directory_upload.py)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`src/tools/tools_sftp_directory_upload.py:40`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ftp_transfer_compressed import ( execute_compressed_upload ) logger = logging.getLogger(__name__) async def sftp_
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/tools/tools_sftp_directory_upload.py
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/utils/utils.py)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`src/utils/utils.py:33`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: from .utils_machine_id import ( fetch_machine_id_from_server )
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/utils/utils.py
low Mutating tool "get_batch_script" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "get_batch_script" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool get_batch_script
low Mutating tool "execute_script_content_by_id" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "execute_script_content_by_id" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool execute_script_content_by_id
low Mutating tool "delete_batch_script" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "delete_batch_script" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool delete_batch_script
low Mutating tool "build_script_from_commands" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "build_script_from_commands" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool build_script_from_commands
low Mutating tool "execute_command" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "execute_command" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool execute_command
low Mutating tool "check_command_status" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "check_command_status" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool check_command_status
low Mutating tool "get_command_output" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "get_command_output" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool get_command_output
low Mutating tool "cancel_command" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "cancel_command" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool cancel_command
low Mutating tool "update_command_status" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "update_command_status" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool update_command_status
Tools 41
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
build_script_from_commandsruns code / shellcancel_commandruns code / shellcheck_command_statusruns code / shelldelete_batch_scriptruns code / shelldownload_directoryingests untrusted inputdownload_fileingests untrusted inputexecute_commandruns code / shellexecute_script_content_by_idruns code / shellget_batch_scriptruns code / shellget_command_outputruns code / shell
Show 31 more tools ↓
update_command_statusruns code / shellupload_filenetwork egressadd_serverno sensitive capabilitycreate_recipeno sensitive capabilitycreate_recipe_from_commandsno sensitive capabilitydelete_recipeno sensitive capabilityend_conversationno sensitive capabilityexecute_recipeno sensitive capabilityexecute_script_contentno sensitive capabilityget_conversation_commandsno sensitive capabilityget_current_serverno sensitive capabilityget_recipeno sensitive capabilityget_remote_file_infono sensitive capabilityget_terminal_statusno sensitive capabilitylist_batch_scriptsno sensitive capabilitylist_command_historyno sensitive capabilitylist_conversationsno sensitive capabilitylist_recipesno sensitive capabilitylist_remote_directoryno sensitive capabilitylist_serversno sensitive capabilitylist_session_commandsno sensitive capabilityopen_terminalno sensitive capabilityremove_serverno sensitive capabilityresume_conversationno sensitive capabilitysave_batch_scriptno sensitive capabilityselect_serverno sensitive capabilityset_default_serverno sensitive capabilitystart_conversationno sensitive capabilityupdate_recipeno sensitive capabilityupdate_serverno sensitive capabilityupload_directoryno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (41 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.3.3.post1 latest |
A 93/100 | 32 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan remote-terminal-mcp --online --registry pypiOther implementations of Remote Terminal 1
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