Raw scan report

Remote Sandbox — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.9.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.

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{
  "tool": {
    "name": "mcptrustchecker",
    "version": "1.9.0",
    "methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
  },
  "target": {
    "id": "remote-sandbox-mcp",
    "source": {
      "kind": "package",
      "origin": "remote-sandbox-mcp"
    },
    "server": {
      "name": "remote-sandbox-mcp"
    }
  },
  "grade": "A",
  "score": {
    "score": 93,
    "threatScore": 100,
    "grade": "A",
    "band": "A",
    "categorySubtotals": {
      "injection": 0,
      "exfiltration": 0,
      "permissions": 0,
      "supply-chain": 0,
      "network": 0,
      "hygiene": 0
    },
    "vector": [
      {
        "kind": "client",
        "term": "capability-exposure",
        "level": "high",
        "label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
        "appliedPenalty": 6
      },
      {
        "kind": "client",
        "term": "verification-discount",
        "level": "repo",
        "label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
        "appliedPenalty": 1
      },
      {
        "kind": "client",
        "term": "coverage-honesty",
        "level": "source",
        "label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
        "appliedPenalty": 0
      }
    ],
    "gatesFired": [],
    "methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
  },
  "capability": {
    "level": "high",
    "reasons": [
      "reads sensitive or local data",
      "has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
      "can execute shell commands or code"
    ],
    "tags": [
      "sensitive-source",
      "code-exec"
    ]
  },
  "coverage": {
    "level": "source",
    "inputs": {
      "toolSurface": false,
      "implementationSource": true,
      "packageMetadata": true,
      "liveTransport": false
    },
    "caveats": [
      "No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
    ]
  },
  "findings": [
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
      "title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (remote_sandbox_mcp/server.py)",
      "category": "exfiltration",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`remote_sandbox_mcp/server.py:125`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "remote_sandbox_mcp/server.py"
      },
      "evidence": "key file, e.g. \"~/.ssh/id_ed25519\" key_passphrase: str = \"\" # Passphrase for encrypted private key (optional) #",
      "owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
        "file": "remote_sandbox_mcp/server.py",
        "line": 125,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (remote_sandbox_mcp/server.py)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`remote_sandbox_mcp/server.py:2647`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "remote_sandbox_mcp/server.py"
      },
      "evidence": "_handle: return subprocess.Popen( [sys.executable, \"-m\", \"remote_sandbox_mcp.server\", \"transfer-work",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "remote_sandbox_mcp/server.py",
        "line": 2647,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (remote_sandbox_mcp/watchdog_daemon.py)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`remote_sandbox_mcp/watchdog_daemon.py:453`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "remote_sandbox_mcp/watchdog_daemon.py"
      },
      "evidence": ") try: subprocess.run( [\"/usr/bin/osascript\", \"-e\", script], capture_output=Tru",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "remote_sandbox_mcp/watchdog_daemon.py",
        "line": 453,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (remote_sandbox_mcp/watchdog_service.py)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`remote_sandbox_mcp/watchdog_service.py:103`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "remote_sandbox_mcp/watchdog_service.py"
      },
      "evidence": "} result = subprocess.run( [\"launchctl\", \"print\", f\"{_launchctl_target()}/{label}\"], captur",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "remote_sandbox_mcp/watchdog_service.py",
        "line": 103,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SUP-012",
      "title": "Package has no license",
      "category": "hygiene",
      "severity": "info",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "\"remote-sandbox-mcp\" has no declared license. This is a legal/reuse concern, not a security finding.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "package",
        "name": "remote-sandbox-mcp"
      }
    }
  ],
  "toxicFlows": [],
  "capabilities": [],
  "surfaceDigest": "761090d6c3280e39f471ef301305b6b179572b80d1c791a1903e14c02f10068b",
  "stats": {
    "tools": 0,
    "prompts": 0,
    "resources": 0,
    "findingsBySeverity": {
      "critical": 0,
      "high": 4,
      "medium": 0,
      "low": 0,
      "info": 1
    }
  }
}