Redmine Mcp Workflows MCP Server
redmine-mcp-workflows
PyPI
v1.0.0
Published by avicennasis — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: redmine_download_attachment → redmine_list_project_files → redmine_bulk_create_issues. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow redmine_download_attachment → redmine_list_project_files → redmine_bulk_create_issues
Tools 81
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
redmine_bulk_create_issuesnetwork egressredmine_create_issuenetwork egressredmine_create_issue_categorynetwork egressredmine_download_attachmentingests untrusted inputredmine_get_groupingests untrusted inputredmine_get_issueingests untrusted inputredmine_get_roleingests untrusted inputredmine_get_useringests untrusted inputredmine_get_versioningests untrusted inputredmine_get_wiki_pageingests untrusted input
Show 71 more tools ↓
redmine_invalidate_cachenetwork egressredmine_list_project_filesreads sensitive dataredmine_add_commentno sensitive capabilityredmine_add_group_userno sensitive capabilityredmine_add_membershipno sensitive capabilityredmine_add_relationno sensitive capabilityredmine_add_watcherno sensitive capabilityredmine_archive_projectno sensitive capabilityredmine_assign_issue_to_versionno sensitive capabilityredmine_bulk_closeno sensitive capabilityredmine_bulk_update_issuesno sensitive capabilityredmine_close_issueno sensitive capabilityredmine_create_groupno sensitive capabilityredmine_create_messageno sensitive capabilityredmine_create_newsno sensitive capabilityredmine_create_projectno sensitive capabilityredmine_create_time_entryno sensitive capabilityredmine_create_versionno sensitive capabilityredmine_create_wiki_pageno sensitive capabilityredmine_delete_groupno sensitive capabilityredmine_delete_issueno sensitive capabilityredmine_delete_issue_categoryno sensitive capabilityredmine_delete_messageno sensitive capabilityredmine_delete_newsno sensitive capabilityredmine_delete_projectno sensitive capabilityredmine_delete_time_entryno sensitive capabilityredmine_delete_versionno sensitive capabilityredmine_delete_wiki_pageno sensitive capabilityredmine_describe_projectno sensitive capabilityredmine_describe_trackerno sensitive capabilityredmine_get_journalsno sensitive capabilityredmine_list_boardsno sensitive capabilityredmine_list_custom_fieldsno sensitive capabilityredmine_list_enumerationsno sensitive capabilityredmine_list_groupsno sensitive capabilityredmine_list_issue_categoriesno sensitive capabilityredmine_list_issue_statusesno sensitive capabilityredmine_list_membershipsno sensitive capabilityredmine_list_messagesno sensitive capabilityredmine_list_newsno sensitive capabilityredmine_list_projectsno sensitive capabilityredmine_list_queriesno sensitive capabilityredmine_list_relationsno sensitive capabilityredmine_list_rolesno sensitive capabilityredmine_list_time_entriesno sensitive capabilityredmine_list_trackersno sensitive capabilityredmine_list_usersno sensitive capabilityredmine_list_versionsno sensitive capabilityredmine_list_watchersno sensitive capabilityredmine_remove_group_userno sensitive capabilityredmine_remove_membershipno sensitive capabilityredmine_remove_relationno sensitive capabilityredmine_remove_watcherno sensitive capabilityredmine_reply_messageno sensitive capabilityredmine_requestno sensitive capabilityredmine_searchno sensitive capabilityredmine_search_issuesno sensitive capabilityredmine_set_parent_issueno sensitive capabilityredmine_unarchive_projectno sensitive capabilityredmine_update_groupno sensitive capabilityredmine_update_issueno sensitive capabilityredmine_update_issue_categoryno sensitive capabilityredmine_update_journalno sensitive capabilityredmine_update_membershipno sensitive capabilityredmine_update_newsno sensitive capabilityredmine_update_projectno sensitive capabilityredmine_update_time_entryno sensitive capabilityredmine_update_versionno sensitive capabilityredmine_update_wiki_pageno sensitive capabilityredmine_upload_attachmentno sensitive capabilityredmine_upload_project_fileno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (81 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 1 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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