Redmine — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "redmine-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "redmine-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "redmine-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 99,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "minimal",
"label": "capability blast radius (minimal) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "minimal",
"reasons": [],
"tags": []
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (22 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/scripts/claude_integration.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/scripts/claude_integration.py:20`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/scripts/claude_integration.py"
},
"evidence": "以直接執行 result = subprocess.run([ sys.executable, \"-m\", \"redmine_mcp.server\", \"--help\" ], c",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/scripts/claude_integration.py",
"line": 20,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/scripts/installation.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/scripts/installation.py:38`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/scripts/installation.py"
},
"evidence": "try: result = subprocess.run([\"which\", \"redmine-mcp\"], capture_output=True, te",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/scripts/installation.py",
"line": 38,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (tests/scripts/installation.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/scripts/installation.py:123`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/scripts/installation.py"
},
"evidence": "try: __import__(f'redmine_mcp.{module}') print(f\"✅ 模組 {module} 可用\") exc",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "tests/scripts/installation.py",
"line": 123,
"nonRuntime": true
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "server_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "health_check",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_issue",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_issue_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_project_issues",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_issue_statuses",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_trackers",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_priorities",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_time_entry_activities",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_document_categories",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_projects",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_issues",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_issue_content",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_issue_note",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "assign_issue",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_new_issue",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_my_issues",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "close_issue",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_users",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_users",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_user",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "refresh_cache",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "1fea89075d266cca56de7b3e84a812b7603f531a820576e93bcce571f21c69ee",
"stats": {
"tools": 22,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 0,
"medium": 0,
"low": 3,
"info": 0
}
}
}