React Native Upgrader — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.10.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.10.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"target": {
"id": "react-native-upgrader-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "react-native-upgrader-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "react-native-upgrader-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 96,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "moderate",
"label": "capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 3
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"capability": {
"level": "moderate",
"reasons": [
"can send data / act on an external service"
],
"tags": [
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (5 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (index.ts)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`index.ts:26`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "index.ts"
},
"evidence": "const response = await fetch(`https://api.github.com/repos/facebook/react-native/releases/latest`); const data = aw",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "index.ts",
"line": 26,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (lib/index.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`lib/index.js:4150`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "lib/index.js"
},
"evidence": "const response = await fetch(`https://api.github.com/repos/facebook/react-native/releases/latest`); const data = awai",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "lib/index.js",
"line": 4150,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (src/services.ts)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/services.ts:6`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/services.ts"
},
"evidence": "const response = await fetch(`https://api.github.com/repos/facebook/react-native/releases/latest`); const data = aw",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "src/services.ts",
"line": 6,
"nonRuntime": false
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "get-react-native-stable-version",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get-react-native-diff",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get-user-version",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get-stable-version",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get-rc-version",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "9498645c505353ef551cf3886ad164185152ad270113b6a7a2fe40c769a4b92a",
"stats": {
"tools": 5,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 0,
"medium": 3,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}