Raven MCP Server
raven-mcp
npm
v2.5.1
Source verified
Published by rhinocap — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Design intelligence and creative orchestration MCP server — principles, patterns, tokens, audits, brand guidance, local brand profiles, assets, campaign plans, and provider-agnostic image/video/3D/audio generation jobs.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 6 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { closeSync, openSync, readFileSync, readSync, readdirSync, existsSync, r
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:810`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: var res = await fetch("https://registry.npmjs.org/raven-mcp/latest", { signal: controller.signal,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/raven-polish.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/raven-polish.mjs:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import { dirname, join, resolve } from "node:path"; import { fileURLToPath } fro
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/raven-polish.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/sync-codex-approvals.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/sync-codex-approvals.mjs:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; const __dirname = path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)); const repoRoot
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/sync-codex-approvals.mjs
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"raven-mcp" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node scripts/postinstall.cjs || true
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package raven-mcp
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 10
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.5.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v2.5.0 |
A 92/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-22 |
v2.4.1 |
A 92/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-16 |
v2.4.0 |
A 92/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-13 |
v2.3.0 |
A 92/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-10 |
Show 5 more versions ↓
v2.2.9 |
A 92/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-28 |
v2.2.8 |
A 92/100 | 4 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
v2.2.6 |
A 92/100 | 4 | 1.10.0 | 2026-07-25 |
v2.2.2 |
A 92/100 | 4 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-24 |
v2.2.0 |
A 92/100 | 4 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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