Raw scan report

Ratio Mcp Qa Dev — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.

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{
  "tool": {
    "name": "mcptrustchecker",
    "version": "1.13.0",
    "methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
  },
  "target": {
    "id": "@ratio-mcp-qa/dev-server",
    "source": {
      "kind": "package",
      "origin": "@ratio-mcp-qa/dev-server"
    },
    "server": {
      "name": "@ratio-mcp-qa/dev-server"
    }
  },
  "grade": "B",
  "score": {
    "score": 86,
    "threatScore": 94,
    "grade": "B",
    "band": "B",
    "categorySubtotals": {
      "injection": 6.3,
      "exfiltration": 0,
      "permissions": 0,
      "supply-chain": 0,
      "network": 0,
      "hygiene": 0
    },
    "vector": [
      {
        "kind": "threat",
        "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
        "category": "injection",
        "severity": "medium",
        "confidence": "strong",
        "rawWeight": 9,
        "confidenceMult": 0.7,
        "diminishingFactor": 1,
        "appliedPenalty": 6.3
      },
      {
        "kind": "client",
        "term": "capability-exposure",
        "level": "high",
        "label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
        "appliedPenalty": 6
      },
      {
        "kind": "client",
        "term": "verification-discount",
        "level": "none",
        "label": "publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read",
        "appliedPenalty": 2
      },
      {
        "kind": "client",
        "term": "coverage-honesty",
        "level": "source",
        "label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
        "appliedPenalty": 0
      }
    ],
    "gatesFired": [],
    "methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
  },
  "capability": {
    "level": "high",
    "reasons": [
      "can execute shell commands or code"
    ],
    "tags": [
      "code-exec"
    ]
  },
  "coverage": {
    "level": "source",
    "inputs": {
      "toolSurface": false,
      "implementationSource": true,
      "packageMetadata": true,
      "liveTransport": false
    },
    "caveats": [
      "No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
    ]
  },
  "findings": [
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/codegen.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/codegen.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/tools/codegen.js"
      },
      "evidence": "execSync, spawn } from 'child_process'; import { getRequirements } from '../store/requirements-store.js'; import { getSe",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "dist/tools/codegen.js",
        "line": 6,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/hookdeck.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/hookdeck.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/tools/hookdeck.js"
      },
      "evidence": "cSync, execFile } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import { logger } from '../utils/logger.js'; c",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "dist/tools/hookdeck.js",
        "line": 5,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
      "title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/tools/codegen.js)",
      "category": "injection",
      "severity": "medium",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/codegen.js:561`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/tools/codegen.js"
      },
      "evidence": "const existingPid = execSync(`lsof -ti :${port}`, { stdio: 'pipe', timeout: 5000 }).toString().trim();",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
        "file": "dist/tools/codegen.js",
        "line": 561,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/tools/build.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "low",
      "confidence": "heuristic",
      "description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/tools/build.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/tools/build.js"
      },
      "evidence": "port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import { logger } from '../utils/logger.js'; import { ToolExecutionError, BuildE",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "dist/tools/build.js",
        "line": 5,
        "nonRuntime": true
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SUP-012",
      "title": "Package has no license",
      "category": "hygiene",
      "severity": "info",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "\"@ratio-mcp-qa/dev-server\" has no declared license. This is a legal/reuse concern, not a security finding.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "package",
        "name": "@ratio-mcp-qa/dev-server"
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
      "title": "Package declares no source repository",
      "category": "supply-chain",
      "severity": "info",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "\"@ratio-mcp-qa/dev-server\" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.",
      "remediation": "Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "package",
        "name": "@ratio-mcp-qa/dev-server"
      }
    }
  ],
  "toxicFlows": [],
  "capabilities": [],
  "surfaceDigest": "6feb639b5445f306725290feefcc2074615dbce242a2a0c3b29323a4261c52b8",
  "stats": {
    "tools": 0,
    "prompts": 0,
    "resources": 0,
    "findingsBySeverity": {
      "critical": 0,
      "high": 2,
      "medium": 1,
      "low": 1,
      "info": 2
    }
  }
}