Rag Reviewer — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.7.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.7.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.7"
},
"target": {
"id": "rag-reviewer",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "rag-reviewer"
},
"server": {
"name": "rag-reviewer"
}
},
"grade": "C",
"score": {
"score": 72,
"threatScore": 83,
"grade": "C",
"band": "C",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 15.4,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 2.1,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-004",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 22,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 15.4
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 2.1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "none",
"label": "publisher verification (unlocatable) — no provenance and no public repository to inspect",
"appliedPenalty": 5
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.7"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can send data / act on an external service",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"external-sink",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (34 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-004",
"title": "Sensitive-source and external-sink co-exist",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tools that read sensitive data ([read_file]) and tools that can send data out ([publish_review, post_pr_walkthrough]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.",
"remediation": "Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"sources": [
"read_file"
],
"sinks": [
"publish_review",
"post_pr_walkthrough"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (reviewer/install_codex.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`reviewer/install_codex.py:950`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "reviewer/install_codex.py"
},
"evidence": "dict(os.environ)",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "reviewer/install_codex.py",
"line": 950
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-004",
"title": "Obfuscated / encoded payload in server code (reviewer/graph/scip_pb2.py)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`reviewer/graph/scip_pb2.py:27`): Decoding an encoded blob and executing it is how malicious logic is hidden from human review of the source. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "reviewer/graph/scip_pb2.py"
},
"evidence": "\\x10\\x01\\x1a\\x02\\x08\\x01\\x12\\x08",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-004",
"file": "reviewer/graph/scip_pb2.py",
"line": 27
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (reviewer/entrypoints/cli.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`reviewer/entrypoints/cli.py:774`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "reviewer/entrypoints/cli.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "reviewer/entrypoints/cli.py",
"line": 774
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (reviewer/gitutil.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`reviewer/gitutil.py:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "reviewer/gitutil.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "reviewer/gitutil.py",
"line": 8
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (reviewer/graph/scip.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`reviewer/graph/scip.py:73`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "reviewer/graph/scip.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "reviewer/graph/scip.py",
"line": 73
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (reviewer/install_codex.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`reviewer/install_codex.py:290`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "reviewer/install_codex.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "reviewer/install_codex.py",
"line": 290
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (reviewer/services/branch.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`reviewer/services/branch.py:31`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "reviewer/services/branch.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "reviewer/services/branch.py",
"line": 31
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (tests/test_gitutil.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`tests/test_gitutil.py:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_gitutil.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_gitutil.py",
"line": 6
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (tests/test_infrastructure_policy.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`tests/test_infrastructure_policy.py:68`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_infrastructure_policy.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_infrastructure_policy.py",
"line": 68
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
"title": "Package has no source repository",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"rag-reviewer\" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.",
"remediation": "Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "rag-reviewer"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [],
"sensitiveSource": [
"read_file"
],
"externalSink": [
"publish_review",
"post_pr_walkthrough"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"read_file",
"post_pr_walkthrough"
],
"pathWired": false,
"description": "A sensitive-source → external-sink chain exists: read_file → post_pr_walkthrough."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "prepare_review",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_code",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_related_symbols",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "read_file",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"read_file\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_definition",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "find_callers",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_changed_file_diff",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_impact",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "index_task",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "index_tasks_batch",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "purge_orphaned_tasks",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "sync_board",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "finish_task",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_tasks",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_task_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_task",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "count_tasks",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_board_config",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_board_targets",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_codebase",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "related_symbols",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "callers",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "definition",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_pr_diff",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_subsystem_clusters",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "index_subsystem_summary",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_subsystem_summaries",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "prune_subsystem_summaries",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "backfill_summary_embeddings",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "publish_review",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"publish\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "submit_findings",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "submit_verdicts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_candidate_findings",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "post_pr_walkthrough",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"post\""
]
}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "328e53569a98846e48302a72cb36c435203a6146e43eb8239029471c5b8b72d0",
"stats": {
"tools": 34,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 10,
"medium": 0,
"low": 1,
"info": 0
}
}
}