Rag Reviewer — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "rag-reviewer",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "rag-reviewer"
},
"server": {
"name": "rag-reviewer"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (42 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (reviewer/services/risk_paths.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`reviewer/services/risk_paths.py:84`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "reviewer/services/risk_paths.py"
},
"evidence": "or basename in {\".npmrc\", \".pypirc\", \".netrc\"} or stem in {\"secret\", \"secrets\", \"credential\", \"credentia",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "reviewer/services/risk_paths.py",
"line": 84,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (eval/solve_task_metrics/ground_truth.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`eval/solve_task_metrics/ground_truth.py:53`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "eval/solve_task_metrics/ground_truth.py"
},
"evidence": "> str: result = subprocess.run( [\"git\", *args], cwd=repo_root, capture_output=True, text=True",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "eval/solve_task_metrics/ground_truth.py",
"line": 53,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (reviewer/entrypoints/cli.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`reviewer/entrypoints/cli.py:1731`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "reviewer/entrypoints/cli.py"
},
"evidence": "lt=True, ): subprocess.run([\"reviewer\", \"check\"], check=False) elif run_global and interactive:",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "reviewer/entrypoints/cli.py",
"line": 1731,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (reviewer/gitutil.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`reviewer/gitutil.py:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "reviewer/gitutil.py"
},
"evidence": "str) -> str: return subprocess.run([\"git\", \"-C\", repo, *args], check=True, capture_output=",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "reviewer/gitutil.py",
"line": 8,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (reviewer/graph/scip.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`reviewer/graph/scip.py:92`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "reviewer/graph/scip.py"
},
"evidence": "import subprocess subprocess.run([\"scip-python\", \"index\", \".\", f\"--project-name={project_name}\"],",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "reviewer/graph/scip.py",
"line": 92,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (reviewer/install_codex.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`reviewer/install_codex.py:292`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "reviewer/install_codex.py"
},
"evidence": "Result: completed = subprocess.run( argv, capture_output=True, text=True, check=False, env=env ) ret",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "reviewer/install_codex.py",
"line": 292,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (reviewer/services/branch.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`reviewer/services/branch.py:31`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "reviewer/services/branch.py"
},
"evidence": "try: out = subprocess.run( [\"git\", \"-C\", path, \"branch\", \"--show-current\"], capture",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "reviewer/services/branch.py",
"line": 31,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_gitutil.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_gitutil.py:12`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_gitutil.py"
},
"evidence": ") def _run(*a, cwd): subprocess.run(a, cwd=cwd, check=True, capture_output=True) def test_changed_files_and_file_at",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_gitutil.py",
"line": 12,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_infrastructure_policy.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_infrastructure_policy.py:70`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_infrastructure_policy.py"
},
"evidence": "=\"utf-8\") result = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, \"-m\", \"pytest\", \"-q\", \"-p\", \"tests.conftest\", str(modul",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_infrastructure_policy.py",
"line": 70,
"nonRuntime": true
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "prepare_review",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_code",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_related_symbols",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "read_file",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"read_file\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_definition",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "find_callers",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_changed_file_diff",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_impact",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "index_task",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "index_tasks_batch",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "purge_orphaned_tasks",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "sync_board",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "finish_task",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_task",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_subtasks",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_tasks",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_task_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_task",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "count_tasks",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_board_config",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "report_bug",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_board_targets",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_codebase",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "prepare_task_context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "related_symbols",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "callers",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "implementations",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "family",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "definition",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_file_skeletons",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_pr_diff",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_subsystem_clusters",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_subsystem_summary_work",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "index_subsystem_summary",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_subsystem_summaries",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "prune_subsystem_summaries",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "backfill_summary_embeddings",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "publish_review",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "submit_findings",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "submit_verdicts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_candidate_findings",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "post_pr_walkthrough",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "efb9ad739611fd8a1fb03cd69e58ef9073d659b10f7faf33e1cd8da15849b398",
"stats": {
"tools": 42,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 7,
"medium": 0,
"low": 2,
"info": 0
}
}
}