Rag Memory (PyPI) MCP Server
rag-memory
PyPI
v0.25.1
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
PostgreSQL pgvector-based RAG memory system with MCP server
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 13
high Shell/command execution in server code (manage.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`manage.py:241`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: capture: return subprocess.run( cmd, shell=True, cwd=cwd, captur
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server manage.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (mcp-server/src/cli_commands/config.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`mcp-server/src/cli_commands/config.py:172`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: subprocess.run([editor, str(config_path)], check=True) console.print("\n[bold green]
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mcp-server/src/cli_commands/config.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (mcp-server/src/cli_commands/instance.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`mcp-server/src/cli_commands/instance.py:933`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: utput) try: subprocess.run(cmd, env=env) except KeyboardInterrupt: pass # User cancelled with C
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mcp-server/src/cli_commands/instance.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (mcp-server/src/cli_commands/logs.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`mcp-server/src/cli_commands/logs.py:29`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( ["docker", "ps"], capture_output=True, text=
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mcp-server/src/cli_commands/logs.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (mcp-server/src/cli_commands/service.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`mcp-server/src/cli_commands/service.py:86`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( args, capture_output=True, text=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mcp-server/src/cli_commands/service.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (mcp-server/src/core/instance_init.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`mcp-server/src/core/instance_init.py:40`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: nviron result = subprocess.run( cmd, capture_output=True, text=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server mcp-server/src/core/instance_init.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/db_migrate.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/db_migrate.py:78`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ist(args) result = subprocess.run( cmd, env=env, capture_output=True, text=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/db_migrate.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/deploy_to_cloud.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/deploy_to_cloud.py:133`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: subprocess.run( command, capture_output=True, ch
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/deploy_to_cloud.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/rag.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/rag.py:169`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( ["docker", "ps"], capture_output=True, text=
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/rag.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/setup.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/setup.py:76`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: nviron result = subprocess.run( cmd, capture_output=True, text=True,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/setup.py
low Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (graphiti-patched/mcp_server/tests/run_tests.py)MTC-SRC-005
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`graphiti-patched/mcp_server/tests/run_tests.py:97`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: __import__(package.replace('-', '_')) return True except ImportError:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server graphiti-patched/mcp_server/tests/run_tests.py
low Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/deploy_to_cloud.py)MTC-SRC-005
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/deploy_to_cloud.py:65`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: __import__(module) except ImportError: print(f"Installing {package}...")
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/deploy_to_cloud.py
low Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/setup.py)MTC-SRC-005
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/setup.py:147`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: __import__(import_name) print_success(f"{package_name} is installed") except
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/setup.py
Tools 29
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
add_memoryno sensitive capabilityanalyze_websiteno sensitive capabilityclear_graphno sensitive capabilitycreate_collectionno sensitive capabilitydelete_collectionno sensitive capabilitydelete_documentno sensitive capabilitydelete_entity_edgeno sensitive capabilitydelete_episodeno sensitive capabilityget_collection_infono sensitive capabilityget_collection_metadata_schemano sensitive capability
Show 19 more tools ↓
get_document_by_idno sensitive capabilityget_entity_edgeno sensitive capabilityget_episodesno sensitive capabilityget_statusno sensitive capabilityingest_directoryno sensitive capabilityingest_fileno sensitive capabilityingest_textno sensitive capabilityingest_urlno sensitive capabilitylist_collectionsno sensitive capabilitylist_directoryno sensitive capabilitylist_documentsno sensitive capabilitymanage_collection_linkno sensitive capabilityquery_relationshipsno sensitive capabilityquery_temporalno sensitive capabilitysearch_documentsno sensitive capabilitysearch_memory_factsno sensitive capabilitysearch_nodesno sensitive capabilityupdate_collection_metadatano sensitive capabilityupdate_documentno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (29 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.25.1 latest |
A 92/100 | 13 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan rag-memory --online --registry pypiOther implementations of Rag Memory 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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