Wallet (rackspay) MCP Server
@rackspay/wallet-mcp
npm
v1.2.4
Published by @rackspay — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
RACKS Wallet MCP — crypto trading, betting, and MPP payments for AI agents. Trade perps on Hyperliquid, bet on Polymarket, pay APIs via Tempo/MPP, and check on-chain balances via Claude Desktop or any MCP client.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 5 = 95. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([racks_get_markets]) co-exist with external-action tools ([racks_mpp_request]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [racks_get_markets] → sinks [racks_mpp_request]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow racks_get_markets → racks_mpp_request
Tools 13
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
racks_get_marketsingests untrusted inputracks_mpp_requestnetwork egressracks_bridge_usdcno sensitive capabilityracks_cancel_orderno sensitive capabilityracks_deposit_to_hypercoreno sensitive capabilityracks_get_bet_positionsno sensitive capabilityracks_get_positionsno sensitive capabilityracks_get_statusno sensitive capabilityracks_get_trade_accountno sensitive capabilityracks_get_wallet_balanceno sensitive capability
Show 3 more tools ↓
racks_place_betno sensitive capabilityracks_place_orderno sensitive capabilityracks_withdraw_from_hypercoreno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (13 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.2.4 latest |
A 95/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @rackspay/wallet-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Wallet 4
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