R Adb MCP Server
r-adb-mcp-server
PyPI
v0.1.3
Published by rahulkr — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Enhanced ADB MCP Server for Flutter/Android Development - 60+ tools for UI testing, debugging, and visual QA
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([get_ui_hierarchy, list_files, read_file]) and tools that can send data out ([shell_command, send_sms]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [get_ui_hierarchy, list_files, read_file] → sinks [shell_command, send_sms]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow get_ui_hierarchy → shell_command
high Tool "shell_command" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "shell_command" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "shell" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool shell_command
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/adb_mcp_server/server.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/adb_mcp_server/server.py:32`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout) if result.returncod
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/adb_mcp_server/server.py
low Mutating tool "shell_command" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "shell_command" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool shell_command
Tools 77
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_ui_hierarchyreads sensitive datalist_filesreads sensitive dataread_filereads sensitive datasend_smsnetwork egressshell_commandruns code / shellcapture_screen_for_comparisonno sensitive capabilitychange_densityno sensitive capabilitychange_screen_sizeno sensitive capabilitycheck_flutter_app_runningno sensitive capabilityclear_app_datano sensitive capability
Show 67 more tools ↓
clear_logcatno sensitive capabilityclear_proxyno sensitive capabilityclear_text_fieldno sensitive capabilitydouble_tapno sensitive capabilityfind_element_by_idno sensitive capabilityfind_element_by_textno sensitive capabilityforce_stop_appno sensitive capabilityget_accessibility_infono sensitive capabilityget_all_text_on_screenno sensitive capabilityget_anr_tracesno sensitive capabilityget_app_infono sensitive capabilityget_battery_statsno sensitive capabilityget_clickable_elementsno sensitive capabilityget_cpu_infono sensitive capabilityget_crash_logsno sensitive capabilityget_current_activityno sensitive capabilityget_device_infono sensitive capabilityget_element_colors_at_positionno sensitive capabilityget_flutter_logsno sensitive capabilityget_flutter_performance_overlayno sensitive capabilityget_frame_statsno sensitive capabilityget_gpu_infono sensitive capabilityget_logcatno sensitive capabilityget_memory_infono sensitive capabilityget_network_infono sensitive capabilityget_screen_specsno sensitive capabilityinput_textno sensitive capabilityinstall_apkno sensitive capabilitylaunch_activityno sensitive capabilitylaunch_appno sensitive capabilitylist_devicesno sensitive capabilitylist_packagesno sensitive capabilitylong_pressno sensitive capabilitypress_backno sensitive capabilitypress_homeno sensitive capabilitypress_keyno sensitive capabilitypress_recent_appsno sensitive capabilitypull_fileno sensitive capabilitypull_recordingsno sensitive capabilitypush_fileno sensitive capabilityreboot_deviceno sensitive capabilityreset_densityno sensitive capabilityreset_screen_sizeno sensitive capabilityrotate_screenno sensitive capabilityscreenshotno sensitive capabilityscreenshot_to_fileno sensitive capabilityscroll_downno sensitive capabilityscroll_to_textno sensitive capabilityscroll_upno sensitive capabilityset_animation_scaleno sensitive capabilityset_font_scaleno sensitive capabilityset_locationno sensitive capabilityset_proxyno sensitive capabilitysimulate_callno sensitive capabilitystart_screen_recordno sensitive capabilitystop_screen_recordno sensitive capabilityswipeno sensitive capabilitytapno sensitive capabilitytap_elementno sensitive capabilitytoggle_airplane_modeno sensitive capabilitytoggle_color_inversionno sensitive capabilitytoggle_high_contrastno sensitive capabilitytoggle_show_layout_boundsno sensitive capabilitytoggle_show_tapsno sensitive capabilitytoggle_talkbackno sensitive capabilitytoggle_wifino sensitive capabilityuninstall_appno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (77 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.3 latest |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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