Qvmconsole MCP Server
@qvmconsole/mcp-server
npm
v1.0.2
Source verified
Published by qvmconsole — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP Server for QVMConsole virtual machine management
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 7.5 = 93. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 93 − 6 = 87. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/install-deps.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/install-deps.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } = require('child_process'); const path = require('path'); const fs = require('fs'); // 检测 Python 命令 functi
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/install-deps.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/qvmconsole-mcp.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/qvmconsole-mcp.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: st { spawn } = require('child_process'); const path = require('path'); const fs = require('fs'); // 检测 Python 命令 functi
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/qvmconsole-mcp.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (bin/install-deps.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`bin/install-deps.js:18`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { const result = execSync(`${cmd} --version`, { stdio: 'pipe', encoding: 'utf-8' });
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/install-deps.js
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"@qvmconsole/mcp-server" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node bin/install-deps.js
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package @qvmconsole/mcp-server
Tools 28
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
add_diskno sensitive capabilitycreate_snapshotno sensitive capabilitycreate_vm_from_templateno sensitive capabilitycreate_vm_scheduleno sensitive capabilitydelete_snapshotno sensitive capabilitydelete_vm_scheduleno sensitive capabilityedit_vmno sensitive capabilityget_vm_infono sensitive capabilityget_vm_statsno sensitive capabilitylist_disksno sensitive capability
Show 18 more tools ↓
list_snapshotsno sensitive capabilitylist_storage_poolsno sensitive capabilitylist_switchesno sensitive capabilitylist_templatesno sensitive capabilitylist_vm_schedulesno sensitive capabilitylist_vmsno sensitive capabilityreset_vm_passwordno sensitive capabilityresize_diskno sensitive capabilityrevert_snapshotno sensitive capabilityvm_power_operationno sensitive capabilityvnc_clickno sensitive capabilityvnc_enableno sensitive capabilityvnc_exposeno sensitive capabilityvnc_keyno sensitive capabilityvnc_moveno sensitive capabilityvnc_screenshotno sensitive capabilityvnc_statusno sensitive capabilityvnc_typeno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (28 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.2 latest |
B 87/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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